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Abstract:  
In recent years scholars from various disciplines have turned their attention to transnational 
regimes of regulation that are chiefly developed outside state-driven frameworks. The rise 
of such “transnational private regulation” has also led to the emergence of private meta-
regulation. The term ‘meta-regulation’ commonly refers to processes through which a 
regulatory body oversees another and sets standards for its activities or performance of 
regulation. In the public domain, meta-regulation has been associated with the devolution of 
regulatory activities by a statutory body to private actors with the view to enhance 
voluntary rule compliance, awareness of responsibilities among the regulated and reduce 
public enforcement costs. However, in the transnational private domain the rationale for 
meta-regulation appears to be a different one. We contend that meta-regulation in this 
domain is less concerned with the goal of enhancing rule compliance and efficiency in 
enforcement, but instead is more prominently concerned with the bolstering of the 
integrity, legitimacy and accountability of private regulatory regimes and the coordination 
between such regimes. To furnish this argument the paper develops a comparative analysis 
of two sectoral private meta-regulators involved in transnational private regulation: the 
Global Food Safety Initiative in the food industry and the European Advertising Standards 
Alliance in the advertising industry. These two organisations have developed guidelines, 
benchmarks and performance indicators for other private bodies involved in transnational 
regulatory activities. The comparative analysis is focused around four principled and 
interlinked questions: (i) What has driven the emergence of meta-regulation in the private 
regulatory domain?; (ii) What are the forms and functions of private meta-regulation?; (iii) 
What is its relationship with public regulation and regulators?; and (iv) How and to what 
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The	  Rise	  of	  Transnational	  Private	  Meta-­‐Regulators	  	  
Paul	  Verbruggen	  &	  Tetty	  Havinga*	  
	  
Abstract	  
In	  recent	  years	  scholars	  from	  various	  disciplines	  have	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  transnational	  
regimes	  of	  regulation	  that	  are	  chiefly	  developed	  outside	  state-­‐driven	  frameworks.	  The	  rise	  of	  
such	   “transnational	   private	   regulation”	   has	   also	   led	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   private	   meta-­‐
regulation.	   The	   term	   ‘meta-­‐regulation’	   commonly	   refers	   to	   processes	   through	   which	   a	  
regulatory	   body	   oversees	   another	   and	   sets	   standards	   for	   its	   activities	   or	   performance	   of	  
regulation.	  In	  the	  public	  domain,	  meta-­‐regulation	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  devolution	  of	  
regulatory	  activities	  by	  a	  statutory	  body	  to	  private	  actors	  with	  the	  view	  to	  enhance	  voluntary	  
rule	   compliance,	   awareness	   of	   responsibilities	   among	   the	   regulated	   and	   reduce	   public	  
enforcement	   costs.	   However,	   in	   the	   transnational	   private	   domain	   the	   rationale	   for	  meta-­‐
regulation	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  different	  one.	  We	  contend	  that	  meta-­‐regulation	  in	  this	  domain	  is	  
less	   concerned	  with	   the	  goal	  of	  enhancing	   rule	   compliance	  and	  efficiency	   in	  enforcement,	  
but	   instead	   is	  more	  prominently	   concerned	  with	   the	  bolstering	  of	   the	   integrity,	   legitimacy	  
and	   accountability	   of	   private	   regulatory	   regimes	   and	   the	   coordination	   between	   such	  
regimes.	  To	  furnish	  this	  argument	  the	  paper	  develops	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  two	  sectoral	  
private	  meta-­‐regulators	  involved	  in	  transnational	  private	  regulation:	  the	  Global	  Food	  Safety	  
Initiative	   in	   the	   food	   industry	   and	   the	   European	   Advertising	   Standards	   Alliance	   in	   the	  
advertising	   industry.	   These	   two	  organisations	   have	  developed	   guidelines,	   benchmarks	   and	  
performance	   indicators	   for	   other	   private	   bodies	   involved	   in	   transnational	   regulatory	  
activities.	   The	   comparative	   analysis	   is	   focused	   around	   four	   principled	   and	   interlinked	  
questions:	   (i)	  What	  has	  driven	   the	  emergence	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	   in	   the	  private	   regulatory	  
domain?;	  (ii)	  What	  are	  the	  forms	  and	  functions	  of	  private	  meta-­‐regulation?;	  (iii)	  What	  is	  its	  
relationship	  with	  public	   regulation	  and	   regulators?;	  and	   (iv)	  How	  and	   to	  what	  extent	  does	  
private	  meta-­‐regulation	  contribute	  to	  the	  legitimization	  of	  transnational	  private	  regulation?	  
	  
Introduction	  
In	  recent	  years	  scholars	  from	  various	  disciplines	  have	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  transnational	  
regimes	   of	   regulation	   that	   are	   chiefly	   developed	   outside	   state-­‐driven	   frameworks.	   This	  
‘transnational	   private	   regulation’	   is	   complementing,	   competing	   and	   at	   times	   serving	   as	   an	  
alternative	  to	  national	  and	  international	  public	  law	  frameworks	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  (global)	  
business	   across	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   industries	   and	   sectors.1	   The	   development	   has	   spurred	  
scholars	   to	   revisit	   familiar	   concepts	   such	   as	   legitimacy	   and	   accountability,2	   and	   challenges	  
public	  actors	  to	  rethink	  regulatory	  policies.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Private	  Law	  and	  Associate	  Professor	  of	   Law	  &	  Sociology	  both	  at	  Radboud	  University,	  
1	  T.	  Bartley,	  'Institutional	  Emergence	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Globalization:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Transnational	  Private	  Regulation	  of	  
Labor	   and	   Environmental	   Conditions'	   (2007)	   American	   Journal	   of	   Sociology	   113(2),	   297-­‐351;	   D.	   Vogel,	   ‘The	  
Private	   Regulation	   of	   Global	   Corporate	   Conduct’,	   in	   W.	   Mattli	   and	   N.	   Woods	   (eds),	   The	   Politics	   of	   Global	  
Regulation	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton	  2009),	  pp.	  151-­‐188,	  at	  153-­‐154;	  and	  C.	  Scott,	  F.	  Cafaggi	  and	  L.	  
Senden,	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  Conceptual	  and	  Constitutional	  Challenge	  of	  Transnational	  Private	  Regulation’	  (2011)	  
Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  38(1),	  1-­‐19.	  
2	  Scott,	  Cafaggi	  and	  Senden	  (n	  2),	  at	  14-­‐15.	  
3	   The	  OECD	  has	   recently	   released	  a	   study	  on	   ‘International	  Regulatory	  Co-­‐operation’	   (April	   2013)	   in	  which	   it	  
flags	  transnational	  private	  regulation	  as	  a	  relevant	  trend	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  government	  in	  developing	  
policies	   on	   international	   cooperation	   between	   regulatory	   actors.	   The	   OECD	   report	   is	   available	   at:	  
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-­‐policy/transnationalprivateregulation.htm	  (accessed	  May	  2014).	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The	  emergence	  of	  transnational	  private	  regulation	  has	  also	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  private	  
meta-­‐regulation.	  The	  term	  ‘meta-­‐regulation’	  commonly	  refers	  to	  processes	  through	  which	  a	  
regulatory	  body	  oversees	  another	  and	  sets	  standards	  for	  its	  activities	  or	  performance.	  In	  the	  
public	   domain,	   meta-­‐regulation	   may	   involve	   the	   devolution	   of	   regulatory	   activities	   by	   a	  
statutory	   body	   to	   private	   actors	   with	   the	   view	   to	   enhance	   voluntary	   rule	   compliance,	  
awareness	   of	   responsibilities	   among	   the	   regulated	   and	   reduce	   public	   enforcement	   costs.	  
However,	  in	  the	  private	  domain	  the	  rationale	  for	  meta-­‐regulation	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  different	  
one.	  We	  contend	  that	  meta-­‐regulation	  in	  the	  private	  domain	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  the	  goal	  
of	  enhancing	  rule	  compliance	  and	  reducing	  administrative	  burdens	  –	  as	  is	  usually	  discussed	  
in	  the	  literature	  in	  relation	  to	  government-­‐led	  meta-­‐regulation	  –	  but	  instead	  is	  prominently	  
concerned	  with	  the	  bolstering	  of	  the	  capacity,	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  private	  regulatory	  
regimes,	  and	  the	  coordination	  and	  convergence	  between	  such	  regimes.	  	  
Similar	   functions	   of	   meta-­‐regulation	   were	   recently	   highlighted	   by	   Loconto	   and	  
Fouilleux	  (2013)	  and	  by	  Derkx	  and	  Glasbergen	  (2014).	  The	  first	  couple	  focused	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  
the	   ISEAL	  Alliance	   as	   the	   global	   association	   for	   social	   and	   environmental	   standards.4	   They	  
argue	   that	   ISEAL	   facilitates	   the	   shaping	   of	   an	   organizational	   field	   for	   sustainability	   by	  
institutionalizing	   and	   legitimating	   specified	   actors,	   tools	   and	   practices.	   More	   specifically,	  
they	  content	  that:	  “ISEAL	  actively	  builds	  institutions	  to	  shape,	  provide	  cohesiveness	  to,	  and	  
discipline	  the	  sustainability	  field	  through	  the	  development	  of	  a	  series	  of	  meta-­‐codes	  which	  
fulfil	   two	  main	  purposes:	  harmonizing	  procedures	  among	   ISEAL	  members,	  and	  establishing	  
the	   borders	   between	   insiders	   (credible	   standard	   schemes)	   and	   outsiders	   (non-­‐credible	  
standards	  schemes).”5	  Derkx	  and	  Glasbergen	  compare	  ISEAL	  with	  other	  transnational	  private	  
meta-­‐regulators	   in	   the	   field	   of	   fair	   labor	   (JO-­‐IN),	   sustainable	   tourism	   (GSTC),	   and	   organic	  
agriculture	   (ITF).6	  They	  note	   that	  all	   four	  organizations	  use	   two	   ‘pathways’	   to	  enhance	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  sustainability	  standards:	  one	  concerns	  the	  procedural	  harmonization	  of	  the	  
standards	   setting	  and	   certification	  processes	   to	  negotiate	  a	   ‘consensus	   standards’	   and	   the	  
other	   concerns	   the	  activities	   ‘to	  enhance	   the	  capacity	  of	   individual	   standards	   initiatives	   to	  
bring	   about,	   verify,	   and	   reward	   compliance	  with	   these	   standards’.7	   Accordingly,	   they	   also	  
highlight	  the	  capacity-­‐building	  and	  coordination	  functions	  of	  private	  meta-­‐regulation	  at	  the	  
transnational	  level.	  
We	  contribute	  to	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  the	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  transnational	  private	  
standards	  by	  engaging	  in	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  two	  sector-­‐specific	  transnational	  private	  
meta-­‐regulators	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  studies	  noted	  about,	  namely	  the	  Global	  Food	  Safety	  
Initiative	  (GFSI)	  in	  the	  food	  industry	  and	  the	  European	  Advertising	  Standards	  Alliance	  (EASA)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   A.	   Loconto	   and	   E.	   Fouilleux,	   ‘Politics	   of	   Private	   Regulation:	   ISEAL	   and	   the	   Shaping	   of	   Transnational	  
Sustainability	   Governance’	   (2013)	  Regulation	  &	   Governance,	   DOI:	  10.1111/rego.12028	   (accessed	  May	   2014).	  
The	   ISEAL	   Alliance,	   an	   international	   non-­‐profit	   organization	   that	   codifies	   best	   practices	   for	   the	   design	   of	  
(transnational)	  private	   regulatory	   initiatives	   concerned	  with	   social	  and	  environmental	   issues.	   Its	  membership	  
includes	   amongst	   others	   the	   Forest	   Stewardship	   Council,	   the	   Marine	   Stewardship	   Council,	   Fair	   Trade	  
International,	  UTZ	  and	  the	  Rainforest	  Alliance.	  Since	  2004,	  ISEAL	  has	  developed	  standards	  of	  best	  practice	  for	  
adopting	  social	  and	  environmental	  regulatory	  standards.	  The	  latest	  version	  of	  these	  standards	  is	  embedded	  in	  
the	   ‘Standard-­‐setting	   Code’	   (2010).	   More	   recently,	   ISEAL	   also	   developed	   an	   ‘Impacts	   Code’	   (2010)	   and	   an	  
‘Assurance	  Code’	   (2012),	  detailing	  best	  practice	  on	  performance	  evaluation	  and	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  
of	   standards.	   See:	   ISEAL	   Alliance,	   ‘Our	   Codes	   of	   Good	   Practice’,	   http://www.isealalliance.org/our-­‐
work/defining-­‐credibility/codes-­‐of-­‐good-­‐practice	  (accessed	  May	  2014).	  
5	  Ibid,	  14.	  
6	   B.	   Derkx	   and	   P.	   Glasbergen,	   Elaborating	   ‘Global	   Private	   Meta-­‐governance:	   An	   Inventory	   in	   the	   Realm	   of	  
Voluntary	  Sustainability	  Standards’	  (2014)	  Global	  Evironmental	  Change	  27,	  41-­‐50.	  
7	  Ibid,	  p.	  49.	  
3	  
	  
in	   the	   advertising	   industry.	   Both	   organizations	   develop	   guidelines,	   benchmarks	   and	  
performance	   indicators	   for	  other	  private	  bodies	   involved	   in	   the	  transnational	   regulation	  of	  
business	   activities	   by	   processes	   of	   standard-­‐setting,	   compliance	   monitoring	   and	  
enforcement.	   The	   comparative	   analysis	   is	   focused	   around	   four	   principled	   and	   interlinked	  
questions:	   (i)	  What	  has	  driven	   the	  emergence	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	   in	   the	  private	   regulatory	  
domain?;	  (ii)	  What	  are	  the	  functions	  of	  private	  meta-­‐regulation?;	  (iii)	  What	  is	  its	  relationship	  
with	   public	   regulation	   and	   regulators?;	   (iv)	   How	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   does	   private	   meta-­‐
regulation	   contribute	   to	   the	   legitimization	   of	   transnational	   private	   regulation?	   These	  
questions	  contribute	   to	  answering	   the	  central	  question	  of	   this	  paper:	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  
the	  emergence	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  in	  transnational	  private	  regulation?	  
The	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  We	  first	  define	  the	  concept	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  (1).	  
Next,	  we	  examine	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  meta-­‐regulation	  has	  emerged	  in	  transnational	  private	  
regulatory	  regimes	   in	  the	   issue	  areas	  of	   food	  safety	  (2)	  and	  advertising	  (3).	  The	  findings	  of	  
this	  analysis	  are	  discussed	  and	  compared	  afterwards	  (4).	  Concluding	  observations	  follow	  (5).	  
	  
1.	  Debating	  Meta-­‐regulation	  	  
What	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  “meta-­‐regulation”?	  As	  Coglianese	  and	  Mendelson	  have	  noted,	  there	  is	  
no	  agreement	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  meta-­‐regulation.8	  While	  for	  some	  scholars	  the	  concept	  is	  
linked	  to	  the	   ‘state’s	  oversight	  on	  self-­‐regulatory	  arrangements’,9	   for	  others	  the	  concept	   is	  
wider	  and	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  control	  and	  steering	  mechanisms	  between	  different	  regulatory	  
actors	   and	   levels	   of	   regulation.	   Parker	   appears	   to	   capture	   the	   common	   core	   of	   study	   of	  
meta-­‐regulation	   by	   holding	   that	   it	   principally	   concerns	   the	   activity	   of	   ‘(...)	   regulating	   the	  
regulators,	  whether	  they	  be	  public	  agencies,	  private	  corporate	  self-­‐regulators	  or	  third	  party	  
gatekeepers’.10	  As	  such,	  a	  meta-­‐regulatory	  approach	  requires	  a	  change	  in	  the	  function	  of	  the	  
regulatory	   body.	   Rather	   than	   carrying	   out	   regulatory	   tasks	   itself,	   the	   body	   is	   primarily	  
concerned	  with	  the	  oversight	  and	  control	  of	  regulatory	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  other	  actors,	  
possibly	  also	  at	  other	  levels	  of	  regulation.	  The	  regulator	  (the	  meta-­‐regulator)	  may	  respond	  if	  
the	  other	  (the	  first	  tier	  regulator)	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions	  the	  former	  set	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
framework	  for	  meta-­‐regulation.	  Accordingly,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  meta-­‐regulator	  changes	  from	  –	  
what	  Osborne	  and	  Gaebler	  have	  famously	  called	  –	  rowing	  to	  steering.11	  
	   There	  are	  many	  different	  forms	  of	  meta-­‐regulation.	  Most	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  
the	  public	  control	  and	  oversight	  of	  private	  regulatory	  activities.	  In	  this	  context,	  government	  
control	   over	   individual	   and	   collective	   initiatives	   of	   private	   regulation	   have	   been	   analyzed	  
through	   the	   lens	   of	   meta-­‐regulation.	   In	   the	   first	   form,	   the	   thrust	   of	   meta-­‐regulation	   is	  
concerned	  with	  the	  regulation	  of	  company-­‐specific	   risk	  management	  systems.	  Then,	  meta-­‐
regulation	  overlaps	  with	   the	  concepts	  of	   “enforced	  self-­‐regulation”,12	   “management-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  C.	  Coglianese	  and	  E.	  Mendelson,	   ‘Meta-­‐regulation	  and	  Self-­‐regulation’	   in	  M.	  Cave,	  R.	  Baldwin	  and	  M.	  Lodge	  
(eds),	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Regulation	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2010),	  146-­‐168,	  147.	  
9	   B.	   Hutter,	   ‘Risk,	   Regulation	   and	  Management’,	   in	   P.	   Taylor-­‐Gooby	   and	   J.	   Zinn	   (eds),	   Risk	   in	   Social	   Science	  
(Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2006),	  202-­‐277,	  at	  215.	  
10	   C.	   Parker,	   The	   Open	   Corporation:	   Effective	   Self-­‐regulation	   and	   Democracy	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  
Cambridge	  2002),	  p.	  15.	  
11	   D.	   Osborne	   and	   T.	   Gaebler,	   Reinventing	   Government:	   How	   the	   Entrepreneurial	   Spirit	   is	   Transforming	   the	  
Public	  Sector,	  Reading,	  MA:	  Addison-­‐Wesley	  1992	  as	  cited	  in	  R.	  Baldwin,	  M.	  Cave	  and	  M.	  Lodge,	  Understanding	  
Regulation:	  Theory,	  Strategy,	  and	  Practice	  (2nd	  edn,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2011),	  147.	  
12	  J.	  Braithwaite,	  ‘Enforced	  Self-­‐Regulation:	  A	  New	  Strategy	  for	  Corporate	  Crime	  Control’	  (1982)	  Michigan	  Law	  
Review	  80(7),	  1466–1507;	  and	  R.	  Fairman	  and	  C.	  Yapp,	  ‘Enforced	  Self-­‐Regulation,	  Prescription,	  and	  Conceptions	  
of	  Compliance	  within	  Small	  Businesses:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Enforcement’	  (2005)	  Law	  and	  Policy	  27(4),	  491-­‐519.	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regulation”13	   and	   “process-­‐oriented	   regulation”.14	   In	   all	   of	   these	   forms	   of	  meta-­‐regulation	  
attention	  is	  drawn	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions	  to	  build	  commitment	  and	  
capacity	  among	  firms	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  and	  resolve	  non-­‐compliance	  internally	  and	  without	  the	  
help	  of	  public	  actors.15	  In	  the	  second	  form,	  collective,	  industry-­‐wide	  regulatory	  activities	  are	  
submitted	   to	   public	   control	   and	  oversight.	   This	   principally	   concerns	   the	   regulation	  of	   self-­‐
regulatory	  bodies	  through	  law	  or	  executive	  action.	  Bomhoff	  and	  Meuwese	  have	  argued	  that	  
even	   the	   disciplines	   of	   Better	   Regulation	   and	   Private	   International	   Law	   may	   constitute	  
examples	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  for	  regimes	  of	  transnational	  private	  regulation,	  because	  these	  
disciplines	  include	  rules	  that	  regulate	  the	  activities	  and	  performance	  of	  these	  regimes.16	  
	   Meta-­‐regulation,	   in	   our	   view,	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   control	   and	   oversight	   by	   public	  
actors	  of	  private	  regulatory	  activities.	  If	  regulation	  is	  broadly	  conceived	  as	  being	  concerned	  
with	   the	  attempt	   to	   influence	   the	  behavior	  of	  others	   that	   is	  non-­‐exclusionary	   to	   the	   state	  
and	   that	   involves	   processes	   of	   standard-­‐setting,	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement,17	   meta-­‐
regulation	  is	  not	  a	  strategy	  of	  which	  the	  use	  is	  restricted	  to	  public	  actors,	  but	  may	  be	  applied	  
by	  private	  actors	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  both	  public	  and	  private	  regulators.18	  Importantly,	  also	  the	  activity	  
that	  is	  subject	  to	  meta-­‐regulation	  may	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  one	  specific	  phase	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
process,	   and	   may	   address	   standard-­‐setting,	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   activities	   or	   a	  
combination	   thereof.	   A	  meta-­‐regulator	  may	   thus	   set	   criteria	   only	   for	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  
activities	  of	  another	  regulator,	  while	  not	  addressing	  the	  latter’s	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  
activities.	   A	   regulator	  may	   also	   engage	  with	   another	   regulator	   for	   the	   specific	   purpose	   of	  
monitoring	   and	   enforcement,	   while	   retaining	   full	   control	   over	   its	   own	   standard-­‐setting.19	  
This	   also	   implies	   that	   the	   rules	   being	  monitored	   and	   enforced	   through	   a	  meta-­‐regulatory	  
approach,	  need	  not	  necessarily	  be	  meta-­‐regulatory	  in	  nature,	  although	  that	  can	  be	  the	  case.	  
	   We	  observe	  that	  in	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  meta-­‐regulation	  there	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  (A)	  
the	  oversight	  and	  control	  activities	  of	  public	  actors	  over	  private	  regulatory	  activities;	  and	  (B)	  
with	   the	   objective	   to	   enhance	   voluntary	   rule	   compliance,	   awareness	   of	   responsibilities	  
among	   the	   regulated	  and	   reduce	  public	  enforcement	   costs.	  Parker,	   for	  example,	  discusses	  
meta-­‐regulation	   as	   the	   public	   regulation	   of	   corporate	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   engages	   in	   an	  
analysis	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   such	   an	   approach	   in	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   areas,	   including	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   C.	   Coglianese	   and	   D.	   Lazer,	   ‘Management-­‐based	   Regulation:	   Prescribing	   Private	   Management	   to	   Achieve	  
Public	  Goals’	  (2003)	  Law	  and	  Society	  Review	  37(4),	  691-­‐730.	  
14	  S.	  Gilad,	  ‘It	  runs	  in	  the	  family:	  Meta-­‐regulation	  and	  its	  siblings’	  Regulation	  &	  Governance	  2010-­‐4,	  p.	  485-­‐506.	  
15	  Baldwin,	  Cave	  and	  Lodge	  2011	  (n	  8),	  149.	  
16	  J.	  Bomhoff	  and	  A.	  Meuwese,	  ‘The	  Meta-­‐regulation	  of	  Transnational	  Private	  Regulation’,	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  
Society	  38(1),	  138-­‐162.	  
17	  Black	  has	  coined	  such	  understanding	  of	  regulation	  as	   ‘decentred’	  or	   ‘polycentric’.	  See:	  J.	  Black,	   ‘Decentring	  
Regulation:	   Understanding	   the	   Role	   of	   Regulation	   and	   Self	   Regulation	   in	   a	   “Post-­‐regulatory”	  World’	   (2001)	  
Current	  Legal	  Problems	  54,	  103–146.	  See	  also:	  C.	  Scott,	  ‘Regulation	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Governance:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  
Post-­‐Regulatory	   State’	   in:	   J.	   Jordana	   and	   D.	   Levi-­‐Faur	   (eds),	   The	   Politics	   of	   Regulation.	   Institutions	   and	  
Regulatory	  Reforms	  for	  the	  Age	  of	  Governance	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Cheltenham	  2004),	  pp.	  145-­‐174.	  
18	   See	   also	   Scott,	   who	   holds	   that	   the	   core	   of	   meta-­‐regulation	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘(…)	   all	   social	   and	   economic	  
spheres	   in	   which	   governments	   or	   others	   might	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   controlling	   already	   have	   within	   them	  
mechanism	   of	   steering	   –	  whether	   through	   hierarchy,	   competition,	   community,	   design	   or	   some	   combination	  
thereof.’	  Then,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  tuning	  into	  that	  mechanism	  of	  steering	  for	  meta-­‐regulation	  to	  manifest.	  See:	  C.	  
Scott,	  ‘Regulating	  Everything:	  From	  Mega-­‐	  to	  Meta-­‐regulation’	  (2012)	  Administration	  60(1),	  61-­‐89,	  at	  82.	  
19	   See	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   public	   authority	   responsible	   for	   the	  monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   of	   food	  
safety	  regulation	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  seeks	  to	  engage	  with	  private	  actors	  to	  devolve	  a	  share	  of	  this	  monitoring	  
and	  enforcement	   tasks:	  P.	  Verbruggen	  and	  T.	  Havinga,	   ‘Meta-­‐toezicht	   in	  voedselveiligheid’,	   (2014)	  Tijdschrift	  
voor	  Toezicht	  5(1),	  6-­‐32.	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consumer	   protection,	   sexual	   harassment	   and	   environmental	   compliance.20	   Ayres	   and	  
Braithwaite	  describe	  enforced	  self-­‐regulation,	  which	  is	  considered	  the	  most	  salient	  form	  of	  
meta-­‐regulation	  by	  several	  authors,21	  as	  a	  model	  of	  regulation	  comprising	  two	  key	  elements:	  
“(1)	   public	   enforcement	   of	   privately	  written	   rules,	   and	   (2)	   publicly	  mandated	   and	  publicly	  
monitored	  private	  enforcement	  of	  those	  rules.”22	  These	  authors	  describe	  this	  model	  to	  have	  
several	  comparative	  advantages	  over	  traditional	  forms	  of	  regulation,	   including	  the	  increase	  
of	   compliance	   rates	   and	   the	   reduction	   of	   administrative	   burdens	   and	   public	   enforcement	  
costs.23	  Empirical	  evidence	  shows	   that	  meeting	   those	  objectives	  may	  prove	  difficult	   (if	  not	  
impossible)	   if	   applied	   to	   a	   field	   in	   which	   the	   regulated	   firms	   largely	   consist	   of	   small	   and	  
medium-­‐sized	  enterprises.24	  
	   Current	  developments	   in	   the	   field	  of	   transnational	  private	   regulation	  do	  not	  match	  
the	  configuration	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  meta-­‐regulation	  previously	  described	  in	  much	  of	  the	  
literature.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  competent	  public	  actors,	  meta-­‐regulation	  in	  this	  field	  is	  pursued	  
by	  private,	  business	  associations.	  We	  argue	  that	   their	  activities	  do	  not	  merely	  concern	  the	  
monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  of	   transnational	  private	  standards,	  but	  also	   include	  standard-­‐
setting	   procedures	   and	   impact	   assessment.25	   Also,	   the	   objectives	   of	   this	   meta-­‐regulation	  
differ.	   As	   we	   contend,	   the	   goal	   is	   not	   solely	   related	   to	   increasing	   rule	   compliance	   and	  
administrative	   burden	   relief,	   but	   to	   enhancing	   the	   capacity,	   credibility	   and	   legitimacy	   of	  
private	   regulatory	   regimes,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   coordination	   and	   convergence	   between	   such	  
regimes.	  We	  will	   furnish	  our	  argument	  by	  developing	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	   the	  Global	  
Food	   Safety	   Initiative	   and	   the	   European	   Advertising	   Standards	   Alliance	   in	   the	   following	  
sections.	  
	  
2.	  Global	  Food	  Safety	  Initiative	  
	  
Transnational	  private	  food	  safety	  standards	  
Transnational	  private	  food	  safety	  standards	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  global	  
food	   supply	   chains.	   In	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  BSE	  crisis	   and	  other	   food	   safety	   incidents,	   the	  
food	  processing	   industry	  and	  major	  food	  retailers	  developed	  initiatives	  for	  decreasing	  food	  
safety	  risks	  and	  increasing	  consumer	  confidence	  in	  food.	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  large	  retailers	  and	  
their	  organizations	  are	  playing	  an	  active	  role	  in	  food	  safety	  regulation.	  They	  initiated	  private	  
food	   safety	   standards	   and	   compelled	   suppliers	   of	   food	   products	   to	   comply	   with	   these	  
standards.	  	  
Several	  factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  private	  food	  safety	  standards.	  A	  first	  is	  that	  
traditional	   governmental	   regulation	   seemed	   to	   fail	   to	   effectively	   ensure	   safe	   food	  
supply.Moreover,	   the	   increased	   internationalization	   of	   food	   supply	   chains	   challenges	   the	  
capacity	  of	  national	  governments	  to	  control	  food	  safety	  issues	  as	  their	  powers	  are	  limited	  to	  
the	  national	  territory.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  issue	  salience	  of	  food	  safety	  increased.	  Due	  to	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Parker	  2002.	  
21	  Coglianese	  and	  Mendelson	  2010,	  150;	  Gilad	  2010.	  
22	  I.	  Ayres	  and	  J.	  Braithwaite,	  Responsive	  Regulation:	  Transcending	  the	  Deregulation	  Debate	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  New	  York	  1992)	  116.	  
23	  Ibid,	  110-­‐116.	  
24	  Fairman	  and	  Yapp	  2005,	  516.	  	  
25	   For	   ISEAL	   see:	   Loconto	   and	   Fouilleux	   2013	   and	   F.	   Cafaggi	   and	   A.	   Renda,	   ‘Public	   and	   Private	   Regulation.	  
Mapping	   the	   Labyrinth’	   (CEPS	   Working	   Document	   No	   370/2012),	   http://www.ceps.eu/book/public-­‐and-­‐
private-­‐regulation-­‐mapping-­‐labyrinth,	  at	  20-­‐23.	  
6	  
	  
legal	   responsibility	   and	  because	  of	   fear	   for	   potential	   reputation	  damage	   in	   case	  of	   unsafe	  
food	  products,	  the	  food	  processing	  industry	  and	  retailers	  developed	  initiatives	  for	  decreasing	  
food	  safety	  risks	  and	  increasing	  consumer	  confidence	  in	  safe	  food.	  A	  relatively	  small	  number	  
of	  large	  grocery	  retailers	  gained	  significant	  	  economic	  and	  political	  power	  through	  a	  series	  of	  
mergers	   and	   take-­‐overs,26	  which	   enabled	   them	   to	   to	   expand	   their	   grip	   on	   the	   global	   and	  
domestic	  food	  supply	  chain.	  
In	   the	  1990s,	   several	   supermarket	  chains	  and	   large	   food	  manufacturers	  established	  
their	  own	  food	  quality	  control	  systems	  to	  evaluate	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  suppliers	  complied	  
with	  food	  safety	  standards..27	  Food	  retailers	  joined	  forces	  to	  harmonize	  these	  private	  control	  
systems	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   national	   collective	   standards	   such	   as	   the	   British	   Retail	  
Consortium	  Food	  Technical	  Standard	  (BRC)	   in	  the	  UK.	   In	  due	  course,	  these	  national	  private	  
certification	  schemes	  extend	  across	  geographical	  borders	  and	  evolved	  into	  transnational	  or	  
even	   global	   schemes.	   This	   happened	   in	   two	   ways.	   First,	   supermarkets	   source	   products	  
globally	  and	  want	  to	  ensure	  these	  products	  meet	  high	  quality	  and	  safety	  standards.	  To	  that	  
end,	  they	  require	  suppliers	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  same	  retail-­‐standards.	  
Second,	   retailers	   abroad	   adopted	   foreign	   food	   safety	   standards..28	   For	   example,	   the	   BRC	  
standard	  is	  now	  accepted	  by	  many	  supermarkets	  across	  the	  world.	  	  
Today,	  the	  leading	  private	  food	  safety	  standards	  are	  governed	  by	  either	  multinational	  
retailers	   or	   representatives	   from	   different	   national	   retail	   associations.	   These	   are	   the	  
standards	   of	   the	   BRC	   (British	   Retail	   Consortium	   Global	   Standard	   for	   Food	   Safety),	   IFS	  
(International	   Featured	   Standards	   Food	   standard),	   SQF	   (Safe	   Quality	   Food	   standard)	   and	  
GlobalG.A.P.	   (Global	   Partnership	   for	   Good	   Agricultural	   Practices	   standards).29	   This	   private	  
food	  safety	  system	  is	  very	  attractive	  for	  food	  retailers	  and	  branded	  manufacturers	  because	  it	  
‘reassures	   retailers	   and	   branded	   manufacturers	   of	   the	   capability	   and	   competence	   of	   the	  
supplier,	   and	   reduces	   the	   need	   for	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   own	  
audits’.30	  The	  main	  costs	  of	  the	  system	  are	  borne	  by	  the	  certified	  firms	  and	  buyers	  still	  have	  
a	  lot	  certified	  suppliers	  to	  choose	  from.	  Food	  retailers	  are	  therefore	  the	  main	  drivers	  for	  the	  
emergence	  and	  dissemination	  of	  transnational	  food	  safety	  standards.31	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Food	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  (New	  York/London:	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  2010),	  p.9.	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  Jettinghoff	  ‘Self-­‐regulation	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  Beyond	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  in:	  F.	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  dr.	  Jean	  Van	  Houtte	  (Leuven:	  Acco,	  1999)	  	  609-­‐620.	  
28	  T.	  Havinga,	  T.	  ‘Private	  regulation	  of	  food	  safety	  by	  Supermarkets’	  (2006)	  Law	  &	  Policy	  28:	  515-­‐533.	  
29	  D.	  Fuchs,	  A.	  Kalfagianni	  and	  T.	  Havinga	  ‘Actors	  in	  Private	  Food	  Governance:	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  retail	  standards	  
and	  multistakeholder	  initiatives	  with	  civil	  society	  participation’,	  (2011)	  Agriculture	  and	  Human	  Values,	  28:	  353–
367.	  
30	  http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/Standards.aspx	  (last	  accessed	  May	  2014)	  
31	  However,	   it	   should	  be	  pointed	  out	   that	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   retail-­‐driven	  standards	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  other	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   food	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   B.	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   Private	   Food	   Law.	  
Governing	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   chains	   through	   contract	   law,	   self-­‐regulation,	   private	   standards,	   audits	   and	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schemes.	   (Wageningen:	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   Publishers	   2011),	  M.	  Van	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regulation.	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   and	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The	  development	  of	  the	  GFSI	  
The	  European	  retailers	  not	  only	  cooperated	   in	  developing	   food	  safety	  standards,	   they	  also	  
engaged	   in	   another	   process	   to	   harmonize	   transnational	   retailer	   food	   safety	   standards.	   In	  
2000,	   they	   established	   the	   Global	   Food	   Safety	   Initiative	   (GFSI)	   in	   order	   to	   adopt	   globally	  
accepted	   food	   safety	   standards.	   The	  mission	   of	   GFSI	   is	   ‘continuous	   improvement	   in	   food	  
safety	   management	   systems	   to	   ensure	   confidence	   in	   the	   delivery	   of	   safe	   food	   to	  
consumers.’32	  In	  short,	  the	  GFSI	  wants	  a	  plain	  set	  of	  rules,	  harmony	  between	  countries	  and	  
save	   money	   for	   suppliers.33	   GFSI	   aims	   to	   encourage	   food	   safety	   stakeholders	   to	   share	  
knowledge	   and	   strategy	   for	   food	   safety	   and	   to	   develop	   best	   food	   safety	   practice	   by	  
organizing	   meetings,	   conferences,	   focus	   days	   and	   training	   for	   food	   safety	   managers.	   The	  
Global	  Markets	  Programme	  is	  introduced	  to	  offer	  capacity	  building	  and	  help	  small	  and	  less-­‐
developed	   manufacturers	   and	   primary	   producers	   to	   achieve	   certification	   against	   a	   GFSI	  
recognized	   scheme	  by	   gradually	   bringing	   the	   companies	  quality	  management	   system	  on	  a	  
higher	  level.34	  
GFSI	  is	  a	  case	  of	  private	  meta-­‐regulation;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  food	  safety	  standard	  but	  rather	  a	  
standard	   for	   food	   safety	   standards.	   In	   the	  early	  years	   the	  option	  of	  developing	  one	  global	  
food	  safety	  scheme	  was	   the	  subject	  of	   fierce	  debate	  among	  the	  GFSI	  members	  and	   it	  was	  
decided	   that	   the	  preferred	  option	  was	  not	   the	  development	  of	  a	  uniform	  global	   standard,	  
but	  the	  benchmarking	  of	  existing	  or	  new	  schemes	  against	  a	  common	  denominator	  called	  the	  
GFSI	   Guidance	   Document.35	   The	   initiative	   thus	   sets	   baseline	   requirements	   for	   food	   safety	  
standards	  and	   intends	   to	   improve	  efficiency	  and	   reduce	   costs	  of	   auditing	  and	   certification	  
throughout	  the	  food	  chain.	  GFSI’s	  aim	  is	  to	  have	  all	  food	  products	  sold	  meet	  this	  standard.	  
By	   now,	   ten	   food	   safety	   standards	   have	   been	   benchmarked	   against	   the	   GFSI	   Guidance	  
Document	   (sixth	   edition)	   and	   thus	   recognized	   by	   GFSI.	   China	   HACCP	   has	   applied	   for	   GFSI	  
recognition.	   As	   all	   major	   transnational	   food	   safety	   standards	   are	   recognized	   by	   GFSI	   and	  
most	   major	   corporate	   retailers	   and	   food	   manufacturers	   ask	   certification	   against	   a	   GFSI	  
recognized	  standard,	  GFSI	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  world	  leading	  institutional	  in	  food	  safety	  governance.	  
Many	  food	  producers	  do	  not	  even	  have	  a	  real	  choice	  of	  not	  getting	  certified	  against	  a	  GFSI	  
recognized	  standard	  because	  this	  would	  bar	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  market.	  
	  

























1998	   2000	   Any	  food	  processing	  or	  
packing	  operation	  where	  
open	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  is	  handled,	  
processed	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Food	  packaging	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33	  Global	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2008	   2010	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37	  http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/GlobalStandards/Standards/Food.aspx	  .	  Next	  to	  this	  standard	  covering	  
food	  BRC	  also	  has	  3	  standards	  covering	  consumer	  products,	  packaging	  manufacture	  and	  storage	  &	  distribution.	  
38	  Next	  to	  the	  food	  standard	  the	  IFS	  Logistic	  standard	  is	  developed	  for	  transport,	  storage	  and	  distribution,	  and	  
cash&carry-­‐	  wholesale.	  New	  projects	  are	  in	  development,	  such	  as	  IFS	  for	  Household	  and	  Personal	  Care.	  All	  IFS	  
standards	  are	  developed	  at	  the	  request	  of	  retailers.	  
39	  The	  IFS	  Standard	  is	  managed	  by	  IFS	  Management	  GmbH,	  a	  company	  owned	  by	  the	  German	  retail	  federation	  
(Handelsverband	  Deutschland	   (HDE)	  and	   its	  French	  counterpart	   (Fédération	  des	  Entreprises	  du	  Commerce	  et	  
de	  la	  Distribution	  FCD).	  Retailers	  from	  Italy,	  Switserland	  and	  Austria	  participated	  in	  the	  development	  of	  recent	  
editions	  of	  IFS.	  
40	  Financial	  and	  legal	  ownership	  and	  responsibility	  for	  FoodPLUS	  GmbH	  is	  held	  by	  the	  EHI	  Retail	  Institute	  via	  its	  
100%	  subsidiary	  EHI-­‐Verwaltungsgesellschaft	  mbH.	  EHI	  Retail	  Institute	  is	  a	  non	  profit	  scientific	  institute	  of	  the	  
retail	   industry	   with	   550	   members	   including	   international	   retail	   companies	   and	   their	   associations,	  
manufacturers	   of	   consumer	   goods	   and	   capital	   goods,	   and	   various	   service	   providers.	  
(http://www.ehi.org/en/about-­‐us/company.html	  )	  
41	  Dutch	  HACCP,	  a	  food	  safety	  standard	  owned	  by	  the	  same	  foundation	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  predecessor	  
of	   FSSC,	   was	   already	   recognised	   in	   2003.	   The	   Dutch	   HACCP	   scheme	   has	   not	   been	   resubmitted	   to	   GFSI	   for	  
benchmarking	   due	   to	   the	   new	   far	   reaching	   requirements	   in	   the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document	   Sixth	   Edition.	   The	  
Foundation	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  management	  of	  the	  FSSC	  22000	  scheme	  which	  they	  also	  own	  and	  which	  has	  been	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In	  2006,	  a	   survey	  of	   the	  world’s	   leading	   supermarkets	   found	   that	  75-­‐99%	  of	   food	  supplies	  
sold	  by	  them	  are	  certified	  against	  a	  GFSI	  benchmarked	  standard.43	  In	  2007,	  seven	  major	  food	  
retailers	  agreed	  to	  reduce	  duplication	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  through	  the	  common	  acceptance	  
of	  any	  of	  the	  GFSI	  benchmarked	  schemes:	  Carrefour,	  Tesco,	  Metro,	  Migros,	  Ahold,	  Wal-­‐Mart	  
and	   Delhaize.44	   Later	   other	   retailers	   and	   food	   firms	   followed.45	   Most	   major	   international	  
food	  retailers	  support	  certification	  against	  one	  of	  the	  major	  food	  safety	  schemes.	  Retailers	  
have	  a	  key	  position	  in	  these	  food	  standards,	  as	  BRC,	  IFS,	  SQF	  and	  GlobalGap	  are	  owned	  by	  
retailer	   organizations.	   Other	   stakeholders	   such	   as	   food	   manufacturers,	   wholesalers	   and	  
certification	   bodies	   participate	   in	   technical	   committees	   and	   working	   groups	   of	   the	   food	  
schemes,	   but	   do	   not	   hold	   a	   casting	   vote	   on	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   standards	   in	   these	  
schemes.46	   Since	   2009,	   GFSI	   also	   recognized	   some	   schemes	   that	   are	   not	   initiated	   and	  
managed	   by	   retailers,	   such	   as	   the	   Global	   Red	   Meat	   Standard,	   CanadaGap,	   FSSC	   22000,	  
Global	  Aquaculture	  Alliance	  Seafood	  Processing	  standard	  and	  Primus	  GFS.	  
As	  noted	  above,	  GFSI	  was	   initiated	  by	  a	  group	  of	   international	   retailers	   in	  order	   to	  
agree	  on	  globally	  accepted	  food	  safety	  standards.	   In	  terms	  of	   its	  governance	  design,	   it	   is	  a	  
non-­‐profit	   foundation	   under	   Belgian	   law	   managed	   by	   the	   Consumer	   Goods	   Forum,	   a	  
membership	  organization	  of	  over	  400	  retailers,	  manufacturers,	  service	  providers	  and	  other	  
stakeholders	   across	   70	   countries.	   Initially,	   the	   GFSI	   Taskforce	   was	   open	   to	   all	   retailers	  
worldwide,	  and	  in	  January	  2003	  the	  Taskforce	  consisted	  of	  52	  members,	  all	  retailers,	  mainly	  
from	  Europe.	  Overtime,	  however,	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  GFSI	  changed.	  The	  GFSI	  Board	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See	  n	  39	  above.	  
43	  Fulponi,	  L.	  (2006)	  ‘Private	  voluntary	  standards	  in	  the	  food	  system:	  The	  perspective	  of	  major	  food	  retailers	  in	  
OECD	  countries’,	  Food	  Policy,	  31:	  1-­‐13.	  
44	   Sansawat,	   S.	   and	   V.	  Muliyil	   (2011)	   Comparing	   global	   food	   safety	   initiative	   (GFSI)	   recognized	   standards.	   A	  
discussion	   about	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   GFSI	   benchmarked	   food	  
safety	   standards.	   SGS	   (http://www.sgs.com/~/media/Global/Documents/White%20Papers/sgs-­‐global-­‐food-­‐
safety-­‐initiative-­‐whitepaper-­‐en-­‐11.ashx),	  p4.	  
45	  Currently	  24	  retailers,	  10	   food	  processing	   firms	  and	  4	  catering	  companies	  accept	  GFSI-­‐recognised	  schemes	  
(retailers:	   Aeon,	   Ahold	   ,	   Asda,	   Auchan,	   Carrefour,	   Coles,	   COOP,	   Daymon,	   DelHaize,	   Food	   Lion,	   H.E.B.,	   ICA,	  
Kroger,	   Loblaw,	   Metro,	   Migros,	   Pick	   n	   Pay,	   Publix,	   Raley’s,	   ShopRite,	   Tesco,	   US	   Foodservice,	   Vanguard,	  
Walmart,	  Wegmans;	   food	  processing:	  Campbell’s,	  Cargill,	  CocaCola,	  ConAgraFoods,	  Danone,	  Hormel,	  McCain,	  
Melita,	   Mondelēz,	   Tyson;	   catering:	   BurgerKing,	   Sodexo,	   McDonalds,	   and	   Whitsons)	  
http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-­‐benchmarking-­‐general.html	  (11-­‐9-­‐2013)	  
46	  Fuchs	  cs	  2011.	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now	   comprises	   representatives	   of	   major	   retailers	   and	   food	   service	   operators	   (50%)	   	   and	  
branded	   manufacturers	   (50%).	   Accordingly,	   retailers	   share	   decision-­‐making	   powers	   with	  
food	   manufacturers	   according	   to	   a	   50/50	   ratio	   of	   votes.	   The	   Technical	   Working	   Groups,	  
which	  provide	  technical	  input	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document,	  consist	  
of	   experts	   from	   retailers,	   manufacturers,	   food	   service	   operators,	   standard	   owners,	  
certification	   bodies,	   accreditation	   bodies,	   and	   industry	   associations.	   An	   Advisory	   Council	  
with	   members	   of	   academics,	   ngo’s	   and	   government	   and	   annual	   meetings	   of	   the	   GFSI	  
Stakeholder	  Group	  complement	  the	  governance	  structure.47	  The	  relationship	  between	  GFSI	  
and	  the	  scheme	  owners	  that	  apply	  for	  GFSI	  recognition	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  contract,	  of	  which	  
the	  content	  is	  not	  publicly	  available.	  
In	  course	  of	  time	  the	  participation	  in	  GFSI	  thus	  broadened	  in	  several	  respects.	  Food	  
service	  providers	  and	  food	  manufacturers	  supplemented	  the	  membership,	  which	  previously	  
consisted	  only	  of	  large	  corporate	  retailers.	  Also	  participation	  of	  (non-­‐)industry	  stakeholders	  
is	  promoted	  in	  consultation	  rounds,	  focus	  days	  and	  stakeholder	  meetings.	  Secondly,	  not	  only	  
retailer-­‐led	  food	  standards	  are	  recognized,	  but	  also	  standards	  from	  food	  manufacturers	  and	  
farmers’	  organizations.	  A	  third	  dimension	  of	  wider	  participation	  is	  the	  outreach	  to	  countries	  
outside	  Europe	  and	  in	  non-­‐OECD	  countries.	  Broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  participants	  contributes	  
to	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  GFSI	  as	  it	  supports	  its	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  global	  platform	  
for	   all	   relevant	   stakeholders.	   To	   pursue	   that	   mission,	   the	   GFSI	   also	   recently	   engaged	   in	  
building	   close	   relationships	   with	   international	   governmental	   organizations	   such	   as	   Codex	  
Alimentarius	  and	  WTO,	  as	  well	  as	  national	  governmental	   food	  agencies	  such	  as	  FDA	   (USA)	  
and	  the	  NVWA	  (Netherlands).	   Its	  aim	  is	  to	  further	  align	  industry	  and	  government	  efforts	   in	  
food	  safety	  by	  engaging	  ‘governments	  to	  recognize	  and	  accept	  GFSI	  benchmarked	  schemes’.	  
GFSI	   is	  collaborating	  also	  with	  the	  Chinese	  government	  on	  food	  safety48.	  Thus	  after	  having	  
gained	   a	   recognized	   position	   as	   promoting	   a	   globally	   accepted	   standard	   for	   food	   safety	  
standards,	  GFSI	  seeks	  recognition	  from	  public	  authorities	  as	  well.	  When	  GFSI	  succeeds	  in	  this	  
new	  mission	  this	  will	  further	  strengthen	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  dominance	  in	  the	  market.	  
	  
Meta-­‐regulation	  
The	  GFSI	  is	  a	  benchmarking	  organization.	  Food	  safety	  schemes	  that	  apply	  for	  recognition	  are	  
compared	  to	  the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document.	  The	  first	  version	  of	  the	  Guidance	  Document	  was	  
published	   in	   2001,	   the	   current	   version	   (Version	   6)	   was	   published	   in	   January	   2011.49	   The	  
document	   specifies	   the	   requirements	   that	   a	   food	   safety	   scheme	  must	   implement,	   the	  key	  
elements	   for	   the	   production	   of	   safe	   food	   that	   must	   be	   included	   in	   the	   standard,	   and	  
specifies	   the	   benchmarking	   process.	   The	  GFSI	   requirements	   ‘are	   firmly	   based	  on	   the	   food	  
safety	   principles	   laid	   down	   by	   the	   Codex	   Alimentarius	   Commission	   (Codex),	   the	   National	  
Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Microbiological	  Criteria	  for	  Foods	  (NACMCF),	  relevant	  ISO	  standards,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	   The	   GFSI	   website	   does	   not	   provide	   the	   members	   of	   this	   council.	   The	   Advisory	   Council	   is	   made	   up	   of	  
representatives	   from	   the	   International	   Accreditation	   Forum,	  University	   of	  Georgia,	  United	  Nations	   Industrial	  
Development	   Organization,	   Cornell	   University,	   Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention	   and	   ISO	   among	  
others.	  www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/Detailed_GFSI_General_Presentation_Dec2011.ppt	  (accessed	  May	  2014).	  	  
48	  GFSI	   has	   signed	   a	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   with	   CNCA	   (China	   National	   Accreditation	   Service	   for	  
Conformity	  Assessment)	  on	  collaboration	  on	  food	  safety	  on	  November	  7,	  2011	  and	  a	  second	  Memorandum	  of	  
Understanding	  with	  the	  China	  Certification	  &	  Accreditation	  Institute	  (CCAI)	  on	  27th	  March	  2012.	  This	  will	  allow	  
GFSI	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  benchmarking	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Food	  Safety	  HACCP	  scheme.	  
49	   http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/GFSI_Guidance_Document_Sixth_Edition_Version_6.2.pdf	   .	   See	   for	   an	  
extensive	   description	   of	   the	   Guidance	   document	   E.Fagotto	   ‘Private	   Standards	   in	   Gobal	   Food	   Safety	  
Governance’	  (2013)	  Draft	  paper	  Hill	  project.	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and	  International	  Codes	  of	  Practice	  where	  appropriate’.50	  By	  referring	  to	  such	  authoritative	  
sources	  GFSI	   seeks	   to	   further	   strengthen	   its	   legitimacy	  as	   the	  global	   institution	  setting	   the	  
leading	  benchmark	  for	  all	   food	  safety	  management	  systems.	  The	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document	  
provides	   requirements	   regarding	   the	   content	   and	   procedures	   of	   food	   safety	  management	  
systems	   the	   scheme	   needs	   to	   cover,	   the	   organization	   and	   governance	   structure	   of	   food	  
safety	  schemes,	  and	  the	  organization	  and	  routines	  for	  auditing	  and	  certification	  against	  the	  
scheme.	  
One	   set	   of	   requirements	   deals	   with	   the	   food	   safety	   management	   systems.	   Some	  
requirements	   apply	   to	   all	   certified	   organizations,	   others	   are	   scope-­‐specific	   applicable	   to	   a	  
particular	   sector	   of	   the	   food	   supply	   chain	   (scope)	   such	   as	   farming	   of	   fish,	   processing	   of	  
animal	   perishable	   products,	   production	   of	   food	   packaging	   or,	   catering.51	   The	   document	  
includes	   food	  safety	  management	   requirements,	  Good	  Practices	  and	  HACCP	  requirements.	  
This	   ranges	   from	   general	   requirements	   that	   all	   element	   of	   the	   food	   safety	   management	  
system	   are	   documented,	   implemented,	   maintained	   and	   continually	   improved;	   	   that	  
procedures	   and	   instructions	   must	   be	   in	   place	   for	   all	   processes	   and	   operations	   having	   an	  
effect	  on	   food	  safety,	  and	   that	  a	  HACCP-­‐based	  system	  should	  be	   in	  place	   to	  more	  specific	  
requirements	  such	  as	  the	  requirement	  that	  animal	  medicine	  should	  be	  stored	  in	  accordance	  
with	  the	  information	  on	  the	  label	  and,	  that	  waste	  water	  is	  disposed	  of	  legally.	  
Other	  requirements	  deal	  with	  the	  organization	  and	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  food	  
safety	   scheme.	   The	   scheme	   cannot	   be	   developed,	   managed	   or	   owned	   by	   a	   Certification	  
Body.52	   Representatives	   of	   direct	   stakeholders	   should	   be	   involved	   with	   the	   scheme	  
development.53	  All	  normative	  documents	  of	  the	  standard	  shall	  be	  provided	  in	  English	  and	  be	  
publicly	   available.54	   	   The	   scheme	   needs	   annually	   internal	   review	   and	   a	   reissue	   every	   four	  
year.55	   The	   scheme	   also	   needs	   a	   clearly	   defined	   governance	   policy	   and	   organizational	  
structure	  and	  it	  should	  ensure	  there	  is	  no	  conflict	  of	  interest	  which	  could	  call	  into	  question	  
its	  impartiality	  and	  integrity.56	  	  
Several	  requirements	  deal	  with	  the	  process	  of	  auditing	  and	  certification.	  The	  schemes	  
need	   an	   agreement	   with	   an	   accreditation	   body	   that	   is	   member	   of	   the	   International	  
Accreditation	  Forum	   in	  order	   to	  accredit	   certification	  bodies	   recognized	  by	   the	  scheme	   (in	  
line	   with	   an	   appropriate	   ISO	   accreditation	   standard).57	   The	   performance	   of	   certification	  
bodies	  and	  auditors	  should	  be	  monitored	  (including	  risk	  based	  office	  audits	  and	  announced	  
but	   unscheduled	   audits	   of	   certified	   organizations,	   auditor	   competence	   assessment,	  
complaint	   procedures	   and	   sanctions).58	   Certification	   bodies	   should	   have	   an	   effective	  
implemented	   quality	   system	   and	   an	   agreement	   with	   certified	   organizations	   to	   ensure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	   http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/What_is_the_GFSI_Guidance_Document_Sixth_Edition.pdf	   (last	   accessed	  
May	  2014).	  
51	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document,	  6th	  ed	  issue	  3	  June	  2012,	  Part	  III	  
52	   GFSI	   Guidance	   Document,	   6th	   ed	   issue	   3	   June	   2012,	   Requirements	   for	   Food	   Safety	   Schemes	   2.3.1.	  
Nevertheless	   FSSC22000	   (and	  Dutch	  HACCP)	   are	   recognized	  by	   the	  GFSI	   although	   the	  owner	   is	   a	   foundation	  
founded	  by	  a	  group	  of	  Dutch	  Certification	  Organizations.	  The	  actual	  responsibility	  and	  authority	  for	  the	  content	  
of	   the	   scheme	   and	   the	   delivered	   certification	   audits	   lies	  with	   the	   FSSC	   22000	  Board	   of	   Stakeholders,	   voting	  
members	   are	   representatives	   from	   food	   industry	   associations.(	   http://www.fssc22000.com/en/page.php,	  
http://www.fssc22000.com/downloads/Board%20of%20Stakeholders%20130806.pdf	  17-­‐9-­‐2013)	  
53	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  2.3.2,	  2.3.3,	  2.3.6	  and	  2.3.8	  
54	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  2.3.4	  en	  2.3.5	  
55	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  2.3.7	  
56	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  2.4.1,	  2.4.2,	  2.4.3,	  2.4.10	  
57	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  1.2,	  3.2	  and	  3.3	  
58	  Requirements	  for	  Food	  Safety	  Schemes	  2.5.6,	  2.5.8,	  2.5.9,	  3.3.8,	  3.3.9,	  3.5.2	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notification	   of	   any	   food	   safety	   non-­‐conformity	   or	   product	   recall.59	   Both	   the	   certification	  
body	   and	   the	   scheme	   owner	   should	   have	   a	   complaints	   and	   appeals	   process	   in	   place	   to	  
address	  situations	  where	  the	  food	  business	  feels	  the	  certification	  body	  or	  its	  auditor	  was	  not	  
objective	  or	  misbehaved.	  The	  Guidance	  document	  also	  contains	  specific	  requirements	  as	  to	  
the	   competence	  of	   certification	   body	  personnel.60	   The	   scheme	  owner	  must	   have	   an	   audit	  
frequency	  program	  and	  should	  specify	  clear	  criteria	  for	  frequency	  and	  duration	  of	  audits;	  the	  
minimum	  audit	   frequency	   is	  once	  a	  year	  and	  an	  on-­‐site	  audit	   is	  expected	   to	  be	   typically	  2	  
days	   for	   manufacturing	   and	   1	   day	   for	   primary	   production;	   all	   elements	   of	   the	   standard	  
should	   be	   assessed.61	   Audit	   reports	   need	   impartial	   technical	   review	   prior	   to	   granting	   or	  
withdrawing	  certification	  after	  non	  conformities	  are	  verified	  corrected.62	  	  
A	   food	   safety	   scheme	   must	   apply	   for	   recognition	   by	   GFSI	   by	   submitting	   the	  
completed	  GFSI	  Benchmarking	  Application	  Form	   (including	  examples	  of	  objective	  evidence	  
to	   support	   the	   key	   requirements)	   and	   after	   paying	   a	   fee.63	   	   The	   benchmarking	   process	  
consists	  of	  six	  procedural	  steps:	  preliminary	  screening,	  preliminary	  desk	  review,	  benchmark	  
committee	   review,	  GFSI	   Board	   review,	   annual	   assessment	   and	   continued	   recognition.	   The	  
GFSI	   Benchmark	   Committee	   assesses	   the	   scheme’s	   standard,	   auditor	   competence	  
requirements,	   certification	   audit	   program	   and	   management	   system	   against	   the	  
requirements	  spelled	  out	   in	   the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document.	  For	  each	  application	  a	  separate	  
Benchmark	  Committee	   is	   formed.	   Its	  members	  are	  chosen	   from	  a	   list	  of	   ‘suitably	  qualified	  
persons	  that	  are	  independent,	  impartial	  and	  technically	  competent	  from	  organisations	  such	  
as	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   and	   other	   appropriate	   experts’,	   though	   cannot	   be	  
‘committed	  users	  of	  the	  scheme	  being	  considered	  for	  recognition’.64	  
GFSI	  commits	  to	  annually	  audit	  the	  system	  of	  the	  recognized	  schemes	  through	  a	  self-­‐
assessment	  carried	  out	  by	  those	  schemes.	  This	  includes	  an	  internal	  audit	  of	  the	  recognized	  
schemes.65	   For	   each	   new	   edition	   of	   the	  Guidance	   document	   recognized	   schemes	   need	   to	  
reapply	   for	   recognition.	   In	   any	   event,	   a	   re-­‐benchmarking	   process	   is	   required	   every	   four	  
years.66	  Re-­‐benchmarking	  may	  be	  a	  demanding	  and	  lengthy	  exercise.	  Not	  all	  GFSI-­‐recognized	  
schemes	  reapply	  to	  be	  benchmarked	  against	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document.	  
In	  2005,	   EFSIS	  withdrew	   its	   standard	  because	   the	  new	  version	  of	   the	  Guidance	  Document	  
(Version	   4)	   only	   accepted	   third-­‐party	   certification	   schemes	   and	   EFSIS	   did	   not	   comply	  with	  
this	  requirement.67	  Another	  scheme	  that	  declined	  to	  reapply	  for	  recognition	  is	  Dutch	  HACCP.	  
The	  scheme	  owner	  decided	  not	  to	  resubmit	  Dutch	  HACCP	  for	  benchmarking	  and	  “to	  go	  back	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes	  3.3.12	  and	  3.3.13	  
60	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes	  3.4	  and	  Annex	  3.	  
61	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes	  3.5,	  3.6.3	  
62	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes	  3.7.3	  and	  3.7.2	  
63	   http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/For_Website_-­‐_Benchmarking_Application_Completion_Guidelines.pdf	   ;	  
Information	   on	   the	   fee	   and	   the	   contract	   between	   scheme	   owner	   and	   GFSI	   is	   not	   publicly	   available,	  
http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-­‐benchmarking-­‐general/overview-­‐-­‐background/application-­‐new-­‐scheme-­‐
/application-­‐submission.html	  	  	  (18-­‐9-­‐2013)	  
64	   http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-­‐benchmarking-­‐general/benchmark-­‐committee.html,	  
http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-­‐benchmarking-­‐general/benchmark-­‐committee/register-­‐of-­‐committee-­‐
members.html	   and	  
http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/Part_I_Annex_II_GFSI_Guidance_Document_Sixth_Edition_Version_6.1.pdf	   .	  
(17-­‐9-­‐2013)	  
65	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes,	  2.6.5	  
66	   Requirements	   for	   food	   Safety	   Schemes,	   2.6.5	   and	   GFSI,	   enhancing	   food	   safety	   through	   third	   party	  
certification,	  March	  2011,	  p.	  10	  
67	  L.	  Joppen	  ‘GFSI	  increases	  its	  reach’	  (2005)	  Food	  Engineering	  &	  ingredients	  April,	  46-­‐47	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to	   basic	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   small	   and	   medium-­‐size	   organizations	   (…)	   based	   on	   the	   Codex	  
Alimentarius	  principles	  once	  again.	  With	  this	  the	  HACCP	  scheme	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  
for	   organisations	   to	   become	   later	   certified	   against	   a	   GFSI	   recognised	   scheme	   like	   FSSC	  
22000.”68	  
Overtime,	  the	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	  of	  GFSI	  have	  expanded	  globally	  and	  evolved	  
in	  substance,	  	  paying	  attention	  to	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  topics	  including	  auditor	  competence	  and	  
stakeholder	   consultations,	   adding	   new	   scopes	   (agriculture,	   aquaculture,	   feed,	   storage,	  
catering)	  and	  focusing	  on	  capacity	  building	  for	  small	  food	  firms.	  GFSI	  has	  thus	  developed	  into	  
a	  global	  private	  meta-­‐regulator	  establishing	  requirements	  for	  private	  food	  safety	  standards	  
for	   the	  certification	  of	   food	   safety	  management	   systems	   for	  all	   sectors	  of	   the	   food	   supply	  
chain.	  Multiple	  stakeholders	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  Guidance	  Document.	  The	  
final	  decision	  on	   the	  Guidance	  Document	  and	  on	   recognition	  of	   food	   schemes	   is	   taken	  by	  
large	   food	  retailers	  and	  manufacturers	   that	  staff	   the	  Board.	  GFSI	   relies	  on	  global	  accepted	  
norms	   from	   Codex	   and	   ISO,	   and	   promotes	   accredited	   third	   party	   certification.	   GFSI	  
succeeded	   in	   its	   mission	   to	   establish	   global	   food	   safety	   requirements	   that	   are	   widely	  
accepted.	  However,	  in	  reality,	  multiple	  food	  safety	  audits	  continue	  to	  exist	  as	  some	  retailers	  
and	  manufacturers	   add	   additional	   requirements	   to	   certification	   against	   a	   GFSI	   recognized	  
standard.	  	  
The	  legitimacy	  of	  GFSI	  is	  essentially	  based	  on	  inclusion	  of	  accepted	  global	  public	  and	  
private	  norms	  (Codex	  and	  ISO),	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  participation	  and	  widespread	  acceptance	  
in	  the	  market.	  GFSI	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  private	  food	  safety	  
schemes	  with	  third	  party	  certification	  and	  has	  created	  a	  forum	  for	  discussion,	  sharing	  best	  
practices	  and	  exchange	  of	  knowledge	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  food	  safety	  management.	  The	  
GFSI	   benchmarking	   requirements	   to	   secure	   serious,	   impartial	   and	   credible	   certification	  
procedures	  also	  strengthen	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  reliability	  of	  private	  standards.	  GFSI	  is	  flexible	  
in	   that	   it	   responded	   to	  criticism	  by	  establishing	  more	  opportunities	   for	  other	   stakeholders	  
(not	   retailers)	   to	  be	   involved,	  by	   including	  more	   specific	   requirements	   (e.g.	   frequency	  and	  
duration	  audits),	  by	  stricter	  benchmarking	  and	  more	  openness	  and	  transparency.	  This	  now	  
translates	  into	  the	  situation	  that	  scheme	  owners	  refer	  to	  GFSI	  to	  bolster	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  
and	   credibility	   of	   the	   scheme.	   GFSI	   has	   thus	   turned	   into	   a	   sign	   of	   global	   excellence	   that	  
scheme	  owners	  are	  keen	  to	  use	  to	  attract	  new	  clientele.	  	  
	  
3.	  European	  Advertising	  Standards	  Alliance69	  
	  
Advertising	  self-­‐regulation	  
The	   European	   advertising	   industry	   has	   since	   long	   developed	   systems	   of	   advertising	   self-­‐
regulation	  to	  control	  the	  behavior	  of	  its	  members	  and	  contribute	  to	  public	  policy	  objectives	  
such	  as	  fair	  competition,	  consumer	  protection	  and	  human	  rights	  protection.	  These	  systems	  
generally	  operate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  elements:	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  that	  lays	  down	  the	  basic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  http://www.foodsafetymanagement.info/net-­‐book.php?op=cms&pageid=53&pageid_up=0&nnl=english	  (17-­‐
9-­‐2013).	  New	  Zealand	  GAP	  has	  been	  benchmarked	   against	   the	  Global	   Food	   Safety	   Initiative	   (GFSI)	  Guidance	  
Document,	   4th	   Ed	   and	   still	   mentions	   this	   on	   its	   website	  
(http://www.newzealandgap.co.nz/NZGAP/Overview/International-­‐Benchmarking.htm	  18-­‐9-­‐2013).	  
69	  The	   following	  analysis	  builds	  on	  the	  case	  study	  report	  written	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  HiiL	  project	  on	  
transnational	  private	  regulation.	  See:	  P.	  Verbruggen,	   ‘Transnational	  Private	  Regulation.	  Case	  Study	  Report	  on	  
Private	   Regulation	   in	   the	   Advertising	   Industry’	   (Report	   HiiL	   project	   on	   ‘Constitutional	   Foundations	   of	  
Transnational	   Private	   Regulation:	   Emergence	   and	   Governance	   Design’,	   Florence	   2011),	   available	   at:	  
www.hiil.org/privateregulation,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	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rules	  with	  which	  advertising	  practices	  and	  marketing	   communications	  must	   comply,	   and	  a	  
mechanism	   for	   the	   adoption,	   review	   and	   enforcement	   of	   that	   code.70	   Trade	   associations	  
representing	  the	  segments	  of	  the	  advertising	  industry	  (i.e.	  advertisers,	  advertising	  agencies	  
and	   the	  media)	   set	   these	   codes,	   but	  often	  establish	   separate	   self-­‐regulatory	  organizations	  
(SROs)	   to	   oversee	   the	   application	   of	   such	   codes	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   According	   to	   data	  
provided	   by	   the	   industry,	   the	   SROs	   in	   Europe	   jointly	   process	   between	   50,000	   and	   60,000	  
complaints	  on	  advertising	  annually.71	  
The	  codes	  of	  conduct	  applied	  by	  the	  SROs	  at	  national	  level	  may	  have	  their	  origins	  in	  
codes	  of	  international	  trade	  organizations	  or	  business	  consortia	  that	  intend	  to	  create	  a	  level	  
playing	  field	   for	   transnational	  advertising.	  The	  principal	   institutional	  actor	   in	  this	  respect	   is	  
the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  (ICC),	  an	  association	  for	  businesses	  based	  in	  Paris.	  
The	   ICC	  has	  promulgated	  codes	  of	  advertising	  practice	  since	   the	  mid-­‐1930s.	  Also	   the	  most	  
recent	  version	  of	  the	  ICC	  code	  continues	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  general	  reference	  point	  for	  local	  SROs	  
to	  adopt,	  review	  and	  enforce	  of	  codes	  of	  conduct,	  in	  particular	  in	  continental	  Europe.72	  The	  
SROs	  in	  France,	  Belgium,	  Sweden,	  Finland	  and	  Turkey,	  for	  example,	  still	  apply	  the	  ICC	  code	  in	  
full.	  However,	   in	  other	  countries,	   such	  as	  Germany,	   Italy	  and	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   the	   ICC	  
code	   has	   been	   less	   influential	   and	   national	   advertising	   laws	   and	   politics	   have	   shaped	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  local	  codes	  for	  the	  most	  part.	  Then	  again,	  advertising	  self-­‐regulation	  did	  
not	  gain	  firm	  ground	  in	  all	  countries	  in	  Europe.	  In	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  Europe,	  in	  particular,	  
few	   to	   none	   robust	   systems	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   had	   developed	   since	   the	   early	   1990s.73	  
Different	   legal	   frameworks	  and	  national	   legacies	  that	  affect	  the	  people’s	  perception	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  public	  trust	  in	  private	  entities	  and	  their	  regulation,	  have	  played	  a	  major	  
role	  in	  holding	  back	  the	  development	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  in	  these	  countries.74	  
	  
Development	  of	  EASA	  
It	  is	  against	  this	  background	  that	  the	  European	  advertising	  industry	  established	  the	  European	  
Advertising	  Standards	  Alliance	  (EASA)	  in	  1992.	  The	  patchwork	  of	  national	  codes	  and	  systems	  
regulating	  advertising	  and	  marketing	  communications	  in	  Europe,	  with	  each	  having	  their	  own	  
particularities	  and	  levels	  of	  sophistication,	  resulted	  in	  higher	  costs	  for	  companies	  wanting	  to	  
engage	  in	  advertising	  activities	  in	  other	  countries.	  The	  European	  Commission	  even	  held	  that	  
the	   fragmented	   structure	   of	   private	   regulation	   in	   Europe	   challenged	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	   J.J.	   Boddewyn,	  Global	   Perspectives	   on	   Advertising	   Self-­‐Regulation.	   Principles	   and	   Practices	   in	   Thirty-­‐eight	  
Countries,	   (Quorum	  Books,	  Westport,	   Connecticut;	   London	  1992),	   9	   and	  EASA,	  Advertising	   Self-­‐Regulation	   in	  
Europe	  and	  Beyond:	  A	  Reference	  Guide	  to	  Self-­‐Regulatory	  Systems	  and	  Codes	  of	  Advertising	  Practice	  (6th	  edn,	  
Poot	  Printers,	  Brussels	  2010),	  19.	  
71	   EASA,	   ‘European	   Trends	   in	   Advertising	   Complaints’,	   copy	   advice	   and	   pre-­‐clearance’	   (Brussels,	   2012)	  
http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=krcjynvjd4ecpa555jxbfaic/2011_Stats_	  
report-­‐final.pdf	  (accessed	  May	  2014).	  
72	   ICC,	   ‘Consolidated	   ICC	   Code	   of	   Advertising	   and	   Marketing	   Communication	   Practice’	   (2011),	  
http://codescentre.com/images/downloads/660%20consolidated%20icc%20code_2011_final%20with%20cove
rs.pdf,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	  
73	  In	  the	  study	  on	  ‘Global	  Perspectives	  on	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation’	  commissioned	  by	  the	  ICC,	  Boddewyn	  did	  
not	  discuss	  any	  system	  from	  the	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  European	  countries.	  See:	  Boddewyn	  1992	  (n	  XXX).	  
74	  See	   for	  a	   study	   in	   the	   field	  of	  media	  self-­‐regulation:	  UNESCO,	   ‘Professional	   Journalism	  and	  Self-­‐regulation:	  
New	   Media,	   Old	   Dilemmas	   in	   South	   East	   Europe	   and	   Turkey’	   (Paris,	   2011),	   http://unesdoc.unesco.org/	  
images/0019/001908/190810e.pdf,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	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European	  Internal	  Market	  and	  threatened	  to	  take	  legislative	  action	  if	  the	  industry	  would	  not	  
set	  in	  place	  structures	  that	  could	  regulate	  advertising	  at	  the	  European	  level.75	  
	   In	   response,	   the	   European	   advertising	   industry	   established	   EASA,	   an	   international	  
not-­‐for-­‐profit	  association	  (‘association	   internationale	  sans	  but	   lucrative’)	  under	  Belgian	   law	  
based	   in	  Brussels.	   EASA	   formalized	   a	   hitherto	  ad	  hoc	  grouping	  of	   SROs	   from	  a	  number	  of	  
West-­‐European	  countries	  that	  had	  for	  some	  years	  discussed	  the	  coordination	  of	  their	  efforts	  
to	   regulate	   transnational	   industry	   conduct.76	   This	   network	   was	   given	   the	   specific	   task	   to	  
oversee	   the	   coordination	   of	   advertising	   self-­‐regulation	   throughout	   the	   European	   Single	  
Market.77	  Following	  its	  mandate,	  EASA	  first	  set	  up	  a	  system	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  cross-­‐borders	  
complaints	  about	  advertising.	  EASA	  would	  not	  resolve	  these	  cross-­‐border	  complaints	   itself,	  
but	  was	  to	  enable	  the	  quick	  transfer	  of	  complaints	  lodged	  before	  an	  SRO	  in	  one	  country	  to	  
the	  SRO	  in	  the	  country	  where	  the	  editorial	  decision	  to	  publicise	  the	  advertising	  was	  made.	  
The	  latter	  regime	  would	  then	  bare	  responsibility	  for	  resolving	  the	  complaint	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
its	   own	   code	   of	   conduct	   and	   system.	   Accordingly,	   EASA	   assumed	   a	   role	   of	   coordinating	  
transnational	   compliance	   and	   enforcement	   activities	   between	   its	   SRO	   members,	   without	  
actually	  engaging	  in	  regulatory	  activities	  itself	  and	  defining	  the	  standard	  of	  what	  is	  fair	  and	  
decent	  advertising.	  This	  latter	  task	  was	  left	  to	  the	  industry.	  
	   Until	  2002,	  EASA’s	  main	  task	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  cross-­‐border	  
complaint	   handling	   system.	   This	   changed	   in	   view	  of	   two	  major	   developments	   in	   the	   early	  
2000s,	  namely	  the	  adoption	  of	  important	  new	  European	  legislation	  on	  advertising78	  and	  the	  
imminent	  accession	  of	  10	  new	  Member	  States	   to	   the	  European	  Union	   in	  2004.	  Given	   that	  
existing	   trade	   associations	   had	   previously	   done	   a	   bad	   job	   at	   adequately	   lobbying	   for	   the	  
interests	  of	   the	  European	  advertising	   industry	   in	  the	   legislative	  process,79	   the	   industry	  was	  
determined	   to	  create	  an	   institution	   through	  which	   it	   could	   speak	  with	  one	  single	  voice.	   In	  
2002,	   EASA	   was	   restructured	   to	   become	   that	   institution.	   No	   longer	   was	   it	   a	   network	  
between	  national	  SROs,	  but	  its	  membership	  was	  extended	  to	  include	  also	  trade	  associations	  
representing	   the	   industry	   at	   the	   European	   level.	   Currently,	   26	   national	   SROs	   from	   23	  
European	  countries	  and	  15	  European	   industry	  associations	  are	  members	  of	  EASA.80	  EASA’s	  
Board	  of	  Directors	  is	  comprised	  of	  representatives	  of	  its	  member	  organizations.	  
With	  its	  membership	  including	  both	  the	  national	  SRO’s	  and	  the	  representative	  bodies	  
of	  the	  European	  advertising	  industry,	  EASA’s	  mandate	  also	  changed.	  In	  addition	  to	  handling	  
of	  cross-­‐border	  advertising	  complaints,	  the	  organization	  was	  also	  to	  encourage	  ‘high	  ethical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  A.	  Cunningham,	   ‘Advertising	  Self-­‐regulation	   in	  a	  Broader	  Context:	  An	  Examination	  of	  the	  European	  Union's	  
Regulatory	  Environment’	  (2000)	  Journal	  of	  Promotion	  Management	  5(2),	  61-­‐83,	  at	  64.	  
76	  EASA,	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  in	  Europe:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Self-­‐Regulatory	  Systems	  and	  Codes	  of	  Advertising	  
Practice	  (5th	  edn,	  Poot	  Printers,	  Brussels	  2007),	  31.	  
77	  EASA,	  EASA	  Guide	  (2nd	  edn,	  EASA,	  Brussels	  1996),	  5.	  
78	   In	  the	  early	  2000s	  the	  revision	  of	  two	  principal	  Directives	  regulating	  advertising	  was	  discussed,	  namely	  the	  
Misleading	   and	   Comparative	   Advertising	   Directive	   (Directive	   97/55/EC	   of	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	  
Council	  of	  6	  October	  1997	  amending	  Directive	  84/450/EEC	  concerning	  misleading	  advertising	  so	  as	  to	  include	  
comparative	  advertising	  (OJ	  L	  290,	  23.10.1997,	  p.	  18))	  and	  the	  Television	  Without	  Frontiers	  Directive	  (Council	  
Directive	  89/522/EG	  of	  3	  October	  1989	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  certain	  provisions	  laid	  down	  by	  Law,	  Regulation	  
or	   Administrative	   Action	   in	  Member	   States	   concerning	   the	   pursuit	   of	   television	   broadcasting	   activities	   (OJ	   L	  
298,	  17.10.1989,	  p.	  23)).	  
79	   A.	  Mattelart	   and	  M.	   Palmer,	   'Shaping	   the	   European	   Advertising	   Scene	   -­‐	   Commercial	   Speech	   in	   Search	   of	  
Legitimacy'	  (1993)	  1(1),	  Réseaux.	  Communication	  -­‐	  Technologie	  -­‐	  Société,	  9-­‐26,	  13.	  
80	  Both	  the	  SROs	  and	  European	  industry	  members	  are	  represented	  in	  EASA’s	  Board.	  See	  for	  the	  organisational	  
structure	   of	   EASA:	   http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/About-­‐EASA/Decision-­‐making-­‐structure/page.aspx/112,	  
accessed	  May	  2014.	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standards	  in	  commercial	  communications	  by	  means	  of	  effective	  self-­‐regulation,	  while	  being	  
mindful	  of	  national	  differences	  of	  culture,	   legal	  and	  commercial	  practice.’81	  Accordingly,	   its	  
mission	  became	  to	  ‘promote	  responsible	  advertising	  throughout	  the	  Single	  Market,	  through	  
best	  self-­‐regulatory	  practice,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  consumers	  and	  business.’82	  
	  
Meta-­‐regulation	  
EASA	  has	  principally	   sought	   to	   fulfil	   its	   renewed	  mission	  by	  sharing	  best	  practice	  guidance	  
and	   supporting	   the	   creation	   and	  development	  of	   national	   private	   regimes,	   in	   particular	   in	  
Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   countries.	   In	   2002,	   it	   first	   adopted	   the	   ‘Common	   Principles	  
and	  Operating	  Standards	  of	  Best	  Practice’,83	  which	  were	  reaffirmed	   in	   the	  2004	  by	   the	  so-­‐
called	  ‘EASA	  Best	  Practice	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Model’.	  This	  model:	  
	  
“(…)	  describes	  the	  various	  component	  parts	  of	  the	  model	  self-­‐regulatory	  systems	  which	  EASA	  
wishes	   to	   see	   in	   place	   in	   all	   existing	   EU	   member	   states	   and	   in	   Accession	   countries.	   It	   is	  
designed	   to	   help	   EASA	   and	   its	   members	   to	   evaluate,	   initiate	   and	   develop	   effective	   and	  
efficient	  systems	  across	  Europe.	  It	  will	  also	  help	  identify	  areas	  where	  investment	  is	  needed	  to	  
develop	  existing	  national	  arrangements	   in	  order	   to	   improve	   the	  provision	  and	  operation	  of	  
self-­‐regulation	  (…)”84	  
	  
The	  Best	  Practice	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Model	  lays	  down	  several	  operational	  benchmarks	  for	  SROs.	  
They	  concern:	  (i)	  industry	  support;	  (ii)	  funding;	  (iii)	  governance	  and	  administration;	  (iv)	  code	  
adoption	  and	  review;	  (v)	  advice	  and	  information	  on	  code	  compliance;	  (vi)	  efficient	  complaint	  
handling;	   (vii)	   independent	   and	   impartial	   complaint	   resolution;	   (viii)	   effective	   sanctioning;	  
(ix)	   compliance	   monitoring;	   and	   (x)	   publicity	   and	   awareness	   of	   self-­‐regulatory	   activities	  
among	  industry	  and	  the	  consumers.	  EASA	  members	  made	  a	  public	  commitment	  to	  abide	  by	  
these	  elements	  by	  signing	  the	  ‘EASA	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Charter’	  in	  June	  2004.85	  To	  
operationalize	   the	  meta-­‐standards	   set	   out	   by	   the	  Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulation	  Model	   and	  
the	  Charter,	  EASA	  developed	  separate	  documents	  called	   ‘Best	  Practice	  Recommendations’.	  
These	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendations	  are	  developed	  in	  the	  ‘Self-­‐Regulatory	  Committee’,	  in	  
which	  a	  number	  of	  representatives	  of	  EASA’s	  SRO	  members	  discuss	  the	  technical	  details	  for	  
guidelines	  for	  SROs.	  The	  proposals	  of	  the	  Committee	  require	  approval	  by	  EASA’s	  Board.	  The	  
Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulation	  Model,	   the	   Advertising	   Self-­‐Regulation	   Charter	   and	   the	   Best	  
Practice	   Recommendations	   were	   developed	   through	   the	   Self-­‐Regulatory	   Committee.	   The	  
best	   practice	   standards	   set	   out	   in	   these	   documents	   provide	   a	   common	   roadmap	   to	   the	  
organization	  and	  functioning	  of	  advertising	  self-­‐regulation	  in	  Europe.	  	  
EASA	  has	  sought	  to	  expand	  its	  meta-­‐regulatory	  for	  advertising	  self-­‐regulation	  outside	  
Europe.	  In	  2008	  it	  established	  the	  EASA	  ‘International	  Council	  on	  Ad	  Self-­‐Regulation’,	  which	  
has	   as	   its	   current	   members	   the	   regimes	   from	   Australia,	   Brazil,	   Canada,	   Chile,	   Colombia,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  EASA,	  ‘What	  is	  EASA?’,	  http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/page.aspx/110,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	  
82	  EASA,	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  in	  Europe	  and	  Beyond:	  A	  Reference	  Guide	  (n	  XXX),	  45.	  
83	  Available	  at:	  http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/EN_commonprinciples.pdf/download,	  
accessed	  May	  2014.	  
84	   EASA,	   ‘EASA	   Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulatory	   Model’	   (Brussels,	   2004),	   http://www.easa-­‐
alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=ayufse45uivrinab2lt1bh45/EN_BestPracticeModel.pdf,	  
accessed	  May	  2014.	  	  
85	   European	   Advertising	   Standards	   Alliance,	   'Advertising	   Self-­‐Regulation	   Charter'	   (EASA,	   (Brussels,	   2004)	  




India,	  Mexico,	  New	  Zealand,	  Peru	  and	  South	  Africa.86	  Also	  these	  countries	  now	  participate	  in	  
EASA’s	  cross-­‐border	  complaint	  handling	  system.	  In	  addition,	  EASA	  has	  drafted	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘International	  Guide	   to	  Developing	   a	   Self-­‐regulatory	  Organisation’	   for	   the	  members	   of	   the	  
International	   Council	   on	   Ad	   Self-­‐Regulation	   and	   indeed	   also	   for	   other	   non-­‐European	  
countries	  that	  want	  to	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  advertising	  self-­‐regulation.	  This	  guide	  essentially	  
outlines	   the	   same	   operational	   standards	   as	   the	   2004	   Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulation	  Model	  
does.87	  
In	   Europe,	   EASA’s	  meta-­‐standards	   has	   been	   quite	   influential	   in	   driving	   institutional	  
change	  and	  organisational	  learning	  among	  the	  SROs,	  slowly	  harmonising	  national	  traditions	  
and	  institutions,	  and	  enhancing	  the	  overall	  performance	  of	   local	  SROs.	  The	  SROs	  that	  were	  
established	  since	  2002	  have	  based	  their	  governance	  design	  and	  operational	  procedures	  on	  
the	   principles	   laid	   down	   by	   the	  model,	   whereas	   the	   SROs	   that	   already	   existed	   have	   also	  
sought	   to	  bring	   their	  practices	   in	   line	  with	   the	  model’s	   standards.	  EASA’s	  annual	  meetings	  
serve	   to	   report	   on	   progress	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulation	  
Model,	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Charter	  and	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendations,	  and	  discuss	  
the	   obstacles	   SROs	   encounter	   in	   that	   process.	   Through	   guided	   discussions	   and	   examples	  
from	   fellow	  SRO	  members,	  SROs	   learn	  how	  to	   improve	   their	  operations	  and	  performance.	  
EASA	   uses	   scoreboards	   to	   monitor	   progress	   among	   its	   SRO	   members.88	   As	   SROs	   have	  
publicly	  committed	  to	  adjust	  their	  systems	  to	  EASA’s	  meta-­‐standards	  and	  simply	  do	  not	  want	  
to	  be	  the	  worst	  student	  in	  class,	  these	  scoreboards	  offer	  a	  strong	  additional	  incentive	  to	  live	  
up	  to	  these	  standards.	  
It	   should	  be	   stressed,	   however,	   that	   the	   implementation	  of	   EASA’s	  meta-­‐standards	  
also	  benefited	  strongly	  from	  the	  backing	  EASA	  has	  received	  from	  the	  European	  Commission,	  
more	   specifically	   the	  Directorate	  General	   for	  Health	  and	  Consumers	   (formerly	   SANCO).	   To	  
push	  the	  entire	  European	  advertising	  industry	  toward	  a	  single	  model	  of	  self-­‐regulation,	  EASA	  
turned	  to	  the	  Commission	  for	  support.	  The	  Commission,	  which	  had	  some	  concerns	  of	  its	  own	  
as	   regards	   advertising	   self-­‐regulation,89	   recognized	   the	   opportunity	   this	  meant	   to	   develop	  
self-­‐regulation	  for	  advertising	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  EU	  (including	  the	  new	  accession	  states	  
in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe)	  and	  saw	   to	   it	   that	  EASA’s	  Best	  Practice	  Model	  and	  Charter	  
commitments	  were	  discussed	  in	  a	  wider	  forum.	  	  
In	  2005,	  the	  Commission	  thus	  held	  a	  ‘Roundtable	  on	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation’	  that	  
included	   staff	  of	   the	  Commission,	   interested	  NGOs	  and	   representatives	   from	   the	   industry.	  
The	  concluding	  report	  of	  the	  Roundtable	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  should	  be	  used	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  impact	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  activity	  and	  increase	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  
SROs.90	  These	  factors	  largely	  overlapped	  with	  the	  elements	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Best	  Practice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	   EASA,	   ‘International	   Council	   on	   Advertising	   Self-­‐Regulation’,	   http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/page.aspx/245,	  
accessed	  May	  2014.	  
87	  EASA,	   ‘International	  Guide	  to	  Developing	  a	  Self-­‐regulatory	  Organisation:	  Practical	  Advice	  on	  Setting	  up	  and	  
Consolidating	   an	   Advertising	   Self-­‐regulatory	   System’	   (Brussels,	   2009),	   http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/01/	  
MyDocuments/EASA_International_	  Guide.pdf/download,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	  
88	  EASA,	  ‘Best	  Practice	  Implementation	  by	  European	  Advertising	  Watchdogs.	  EASA	  Charter	  Validation	  Progress	  
Report	   2005-­‐2011’	   (Brussels,	   2011),	   http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/Best_practice_	  
implementation_in_European_advertising_watchdogs270911.pdf/download,	  accessed	  May	  2014,	  at	  24-­‐27.	  
89	  The	  concerns	  emerged	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  preparatory	  work	  to	  the	  Unfair	  Commercial	  Practices	  Directive	  (no.	  
2005/29/EC).	  See:	  European	  Commission,	  ‘Green	  Paper	  on	  European	  Union	  Consumer	  Protection’,	  COM(2002)	  
final	  531	  of	  2.10.2001,	  5-­‐7	  and	  14.	  
90	   DG	   SANCO,	   ‘Self-­‐Regulation	   and	   the	   Advertising	   Sector:	   A	   Report	   of	   Some	   Discussion	   among	   Interested	  
Parties’	   (2006)	   http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/DGSANCO_advertisingRT_report.pdf,	  
accessed	  May	  2014,	  at	  12-­‐13.	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Self-­‐Regulation	  Model	  and	  Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Charter.	  Accordingly,	  the	  Roundtable	  
report	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   validated	   EASA’s	   approach	   and	   confirms	   it	   as	   ‘the’	   European	  
standard	   for	   advertising	   self-­‐regulation.	   This	   confirmation	   was	   a	   much-­‐desired	   result	   by	  
EASA,	  as	  it	  had	  encountered	  some	  resistance	  within	  its	  membership	  to	  develop	  advertising	  
self-­‐regulation	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   one	   particular	   model.	   The	   backing	   of	   its	   efforts	   by	   the	  
Commission	  gave	  EASA	   the	   implicit	  mandate	  –	  and	   indeed	  a	   fair	  degree	  of	   legitimacy	  –	   to	  
drive	   the	   further	   integration	   of	   the	   different	   national	   approaches	   to	   self-­‐regulation	   in	   the	  
domain	  of	  advertising.91	  	  
The	  Commission’s	  support	  to	  EASA	  was	  reconfirmed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  
new	  self-­‐regulatory	  initiative	  of	  the	  European	  advertising	  industry	  called	  the	  ‘Framework	  on	  
Online	   Behavioural	   Advertising’.92	   This	   Framework	   was	   developed	   by	   the	   Internet	  
Advertising	  Bureau	  (IAB)	  Europe,	  a	  trade	  association	  for	  firms	  engaged	  in	  online	  advertising	  
in	   Europe.	   In	   December	   2010	   and	   March	   2011,	   the	   Commission	   (DG	   INFSO)	   hosted	   two	  
Roundtables	   on	   ‘Interest	   Based	   Advertising’	   to	   discuss	   between	   its	   staff	   members,	   the	  
(online)	  ad	  industry,	  and	  consumer	  and	  privacy	  advocates	  the	  framework	  developed	  by	  IAB	  
Europe.93	   During	   the	   first	   Roundtable	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   Commission	   would	   only	  
accept	  a	  self-­‐regulatory	  framework	  for	  online	  behavioural	  advertising	  if	  it	  would	  conform	  to	  
EASA’s	   standards,	   in	   particular	   those	   on	   reporting,	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement.	   To	   that	  
end,	  EASA	  developed	  the	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendation	  on	  ‘Online	  Behavioural	  Advertising’	  
to	   address	   the	   establishment	   of	   robust	   compliance	   and	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   that	  
would	   complement	   the	   Framework	   of	   IAB	   Europe.94	   Without	   the	   complementary	   Best	  
Practice	   Recommendation	   from	   EASA,	   the	   Commission	   would	   not	   have	   accepted	   the	  
Framework	   of	   IAB	   Europe.	   EASA	   thus	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   building	   acceptance	   among	  
interested	  stakeholders	  for	  self-­‐regulatory	  initiatives	  in	  the	  European	  advertising	  industry.	  As	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	   This	   wish	   by	   EASA	   to	   push	   on	   is	   recognized	   in	   the	   Roundtable	   report,	   which	   holds:	   “(…)	   there	   is	   a	   clear	  
commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some,	  if	  not	  all,	  [self-­‐regulation]-­‐practising	  sectors	  of	  industry	  to	  deliver	  increasingly	  
high	  quality	  self-­‐regulation,	  and	  to	  deliver	  it	  more	  evenly	  across	  the	  enlarged	  EU.	  This	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  for	  
EASA,	  which	  has	  made	  a	  public	  commitment	  to	  improve	  coverage	  and	  performance	  and	  has	  reached	  out	  to	  EU	  
Authorities	  and	  others	  for	  help.	  The	  message	  heard	  from	  EASA	  is	  that	  they	  cannot	  deliver	  their	  vision	  alone.	  If	  
business	   is	   to	  commit	   the	  willpower	  and	   resources	  needed	   to	   improve	  self-­‐regulation	  across	   the	  EU	  25,	   there	  
seems	   to	  be	  a	  need	   for	   clear	  public	   leadership	   to	   the	  effect	   that	  business	   should	  be	  doing	   this.”	   	  DG	  SANCO,	  
‘Round	  Table	  Report’	  op.	  cit.,	  8.	  
92	  Online	  Behavioural	  Advertising	  is	  a	  technique	  for	  direct	  marketing.	  It	  uses	  data	  about	  web	  browsing	  behavior	  
of	   individual	   Internet	  users	  collected	  over	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  This	  data	  can	  consist	  of,	   for	  example,	  the	  
page	   views,	   page	   clicks,	   ad	   views,	   ad	   clicks	   and	   search	   terms	   entered.	   The	   data	   is	   used	   to	   form	   an	   interest	  
profile	   of	   the	   web	   user.	   Mathematical	   algorithms	   calculate,	   in	   real-­‐time,	   which	   advertisements	   should	   be	  
served	  to	  meet	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  individual	  web	  user.	  The	  advertising	  shown	  to	  the	  web	  user	  thus	  increasingly	  
suits	  individual	  interests	  and,	  as	  the	  industry	  claims,	  enhances	  the	  chance	  of	  it	  being	  successful.	  
93	  See	  for	  a	  brief	  report	  of	  the	  meeting:	  World	  Federation	  of	  Advertisers,	  ‘WFA	  participates	  in	  EU	  Commission	  
roundtable	   on	   Interest	   Based	   Advertising’,	   http://www.wfanet.org/en/global-­‐news/wfa-­‐participates-­‐in-­‐eu-­‐
commission-­‐roundtable-­‐on-­‐interest-­‐based-­‐advertising?p=45,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	  
94	   EASA,	   ‘EASA	   Best	   Practice	   Recommendation	   for	   a	   European	   Industry-­‐wide	   Self-­‐Regulatory	   Standard	   and	  
Compliance	   Mechanism	   for	   Consumer	   Controls	   in	   Online	   Behavioural	   Advertising’	   (Brussels	   2011),	  
http://www.easa-­‐alliance.org/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/EASA_BPR_OBA_12_APRIL_2011_CLEAN.pdf/	  
download,	  accessed	  May	  2014.	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The	  description	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  highlight	  various	  aspects	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  
transnational	  private	   regulation.	   In	  discussing	  and	  comparing	   the	   two	  meta-­‐regulators	  and	  
their	  activities,	  we	  draw	  attention	  to:	  (i)	  the	  governance	  design	  of	  the	  organizations;	  (ii)	  the	  
form	  and	  scope	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  they	  produce;	  (iii)	  the	  function	  of	  that	  meta-­‐regulation;	  
(iv)	  compliance	  with	  meta-­‐regulation;	  and	  (v)	  the	  role	  public	  actors	  have	  in	  meta-­‐regulation.	  
	  
Governance	  design	  of	  meta-­‐regulators	  
Both	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   are	   international	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   under	   Belgian	   law,	   set	   up	  
specifically to	  promote	  the	  international	  cooperation	  and	  convergence	  of	  existing	  standards.	  
However,	   the	   governance	   structures	   of	   EASA	   and	  GFSI	   show	   some	   significant	   differences.	  
The	  most	   important	   is	  that	  EASA	  is	  an	  association	  setting	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	  for	   its	  
own	   members,	   which	   are	   in	   part	   organized	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   GFSI,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   a	  
foundation	  setting	  guidelines	  for	  food	  safety	  standards	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  represented	  in	  
its	  Board,	  which	   consists	  of	  multinational	   corporations	   in	   the	   food	   retail,	   food	   service	  and	  
food	  processing	  sector.	  Accordingly,	  the	  meta-­‐regulatory	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  EASA	  take	  
the	   form	  of	  what	  has	   traditionally	  been	  described	   in	   the	   literature	  as	   ‘self-­‐regulation’;	   the	  
regulatory	  standards	  are	  adopted	  by	  those	  addressed	  by	  the	  standards.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
regulator	  coincides	  with	  the	  regulatees	  and	  this	  essentially	  comes	  down	  to	  ‘the	  disciplining	  
of	  one’s	  own	  conduct	  by	  oneself’.95	  The	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	  of	  GFSI	  move	  beyond	  the	  
traditional	  concept	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  because	  the	  regulators	  are	  not	  (representatives	  of)	  the	  
regulatees.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   should	   be	   stressed	   that	   close	   ties	   exist	   between	   GFSI	   and	   the	  
addressees	   of	   the	   meta-­‐standards	   adopted	   by	   GFSI	   as	   the	   membership	   of	   GFSI	   in	   part	  
overlaps	  with	  that	  of	  the	  addressees.	  The	  large	  retailers	  and	  manufacturers	  that	  have	  a	  seat	  
in	  the	  GFSI	  Board	  may	  themselves	  be	  members	  of	  trade	  associations	  that	  have	  benchmarked	  
their	  standards	  against	  the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Documents.	  Retailers	  like	  Metro,	  Royal	  Ahold	  and	  
Coles,	   for	   example,	   are	   represented	   in	   both	   the	   board	   of	   GFSI	   and	   the	   board	   of	   GFSI	  
recognized	   food	   safety	   schemes	   such	   as	   IFS,	   GlobalG.A.P.,	   SQF	   and	   BRC.	   Retailers	   and	  
manufacturers	  participating	  in	  GFSI	  committees	  are	  also	  member	  of	  the	  trade	  associations	  of	  
food	  retailers	  or	  food	  manufacturers	  that	  own	  the	  food	  safety	  schemes	  that	  are	  regulated	  by	  
GFSI.	  
Both	  cases	  of	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  show	  that	  new	  stakeholders	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  
governance	   structure	   of	   the	   meta-­‐regulatory	   bodies.	   These	   changes	   have	   enhanced	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   meta-­‐regulators	   and	   increased	   their	   capacity	   to	   coordinate	   between	  
conflicting	  interests	  in	  the	  industry.	  GFSI	  was	  a	  purely	  retailer	  initiative	  at	  its	  start,	  later	  also	  
large	   food	  manufacturers	  and	   food	   services	  were	   represented	   in	   the	  Board.	  The	  Technical	  
Committees	  that	  provide	  input	  to	  the	  Guidance	  Documents	  include	  representatives	  of	  other	  
stakeholders	  such	  as	  scheme	  owners	  (the	  direct	  addressees	  of	  the	  regulations),	  certification	  
and	  accreditation	  bodies	  (indirect	  addressees)	  and	  industry	  associations	  (representing	  firms	  
that	  undergo	  certification	  or	  ask	  their	  suppliers	  to	  be	  certified).	  The	  Advisory	  Council	  and	  the	  
Stakeholders	  Group	  broadens	  the	  participation	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  discussing	  guidelines	  and	  
developments	  with	  ‘outsiders’	  such	  as	  public	  organizations	  and	  NGOs.	  However,	  the	  formal	  
decisions	  on	  guidelines	  and	  recognitions	  are	  taken	  by	  the	  Board,	   i.c.	  the	  large	  corporations	  
that	   buy	   certified	   food	   products.	   Other	   interested	   parties	   i.c.	   suppliers	   (food	   processing	  
industry,	  primary	  producers),	  certification	  industry	  and	  consumers,	  are	  excluded.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  J.	  Black,	  ‘Constitutionalising	  Self-­‐Regulation’	  (1996)	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  59(1),	  24-­‐55,	  at	  26.	  
20	  
	  
Also	   EASA	   developed	   from	   a	   network	   of	   national	   SROs	   to	   an	   association	   including	  
both	  SROs	  and	  industry	  associations	  as	  its	  constituent	  members.	  It	  does	  not	  formally	  involve	  
non-­‐industry	  representatives	  (such	  as	  consumer	  organizations	  or	  other	  stakeholders)	  in	  the	  
development,	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  of	  its	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards.	  Consistent	  with	  
the	   traditional	   conception	   of	   self-­‐regulation,	   it	   only	   includes	   those	   parties	   most	   directly	  
addressed	  by	  the	  meta-­‐standards,	  namely	  the	  SRO’s	  and	  industry	  associations.	  Recently,	  also	  
EASA	  held	  a	  public	  consultation	  on	  its	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendation	  on	  Online	  Behavioral	  
Advertising.	  While	  it	  thus	  involved	  outsiders	  in	  the	  development	  of	  its	  meta-­‐standards,	  their	  
role	   remains	   limited	   to	   advice	   and	   they	   do	   not	   have	   a	   formal	   on	   the	   adoption	   of	   these	  
standards.	  Compared	  to	  GFSI,	  it	  thus	  appears	  that	  EASA	  is	  more	  ‘closed’	  organization,	  but	  in	  
fact	   it	   involves	  all	   industry	  parties	  directly	  affected	  by	  private	   regulation	   in	   its	   governance	  
design,	   whereas	   GFSI	   does	   not.	   Accordingly,	   industry	   representation	   is	   more	   carefully	  
balanced	  in	  the	  governance	  structure	  of	  EASA	  than	  it	  is	  in	  GFSI.	  
	  
Scope	  and	  instruments	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  
How	   do	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   regulate	   and	  what	   is	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  meta-­‐regulatory	   standards	  
these	  bodies	  adopt?	  We	  find	  strong	  similarities	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  pursue	  
their	  meta-­‐regulatory	  activities.	  Both	  organizations	  do	  not	  define	  the	  substantive	  standards	  
on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   compliance	   by	   the	   regulated	   firms	   is	   assessed.	   Here,	   they	   refer	   to	  
authoritative	  standards	  developed	  by	  other	  international	  institutions	  (e.g.	  ISO	  or	  the	  Codex	  
Alimentarius	  Commission	   in	   the	  case	  of	  GFSI	  or	   the	   ICC	  or	   the	  European	   legislature	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  EASA).	  Instead,	  the	  organizations	  focus	  on	  procedural	  aspects	  of	  regulation.	  In	  both	  
cases	   documented	   best	   practice	   guidance	   (GFSI’s	   “Guidance	  Document”	   and	   EASA’s	   “Best	  
Practice	  Recommendations”)	   constitute	   the	  main	   instruments	  of	  meta-­‐regulation.	   In	   these	  
documents,	  we	  find	  three	  levels	  of	  meta-­‐regulation.	  The	  first	  level	  concerns	  guidance	  on	  the	  
governance	  design	  of	  private	  regulatory	  regimes.	  For	  example,	  the	  GFSI	  Guidance	  Document	  
stipulates	   that	   schemes	  must	   have	   a	   clearly	   defined	   governance	   policy	   and	   organizational	  
structure	   and	   they	   should	   ensure	   there	   is	   no	   conflict	   of	   interest	   which	   could	   call	   into	  
question	   the	   impartiality	   and	   integrity	   of	   certification	   bodies.	   Furthermore,	   schemes	  
developed,	   managed	   or	   owned	   by	   a	   certification	   body	   will	   not	   be	   accepted.	   Also	   EASA	  
adopts	  guidelines	   that	   concern	   the	  governance	  of	  SROs.	   It	  has,	   for	  example,	  adopted	  Best	  
Practice	   Recommendations	   on	   complaint	   handling	   that	   requires	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  
complaints	   board	   (“jury”)	   that	   could	   independently	   and	   impartially	   assess	   complaints	  
brought	  before	  it.	  Also	  a	  possibility	  for	  an	  appeals	  procedure	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  independent	  
review	  is	  required.	  To	  accommodate	  these	  elements	  in	  their	  systems	  several	  SRO	  members	  
have	   had	   to	   revise	   their	   governance	   structure.96	   Also	   EASA’s	   guidelines	   on	   the	   funding	   of	  
SROs	   and	   their	   standards	   of	   service	   have	   challenged	   SROs	   to	   reconsider	   some	   of	   their	  
governance	  design.	  
	   A	  second	  level	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  that	  is	  included	  in	  the	  guidelines	  adopted	  by	  GFSI	  
and	  EASA	  relates	  to	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  activities	  of	  regulatory	  regimes.	  For	  example,	  GFSI	  
requires	   from	  applicant	   scheme	  owners	   that	  direct	   stakeholders	   are	   included	   in	   standard-­‐
setting	   processes.	   In	   addition,	   the	   GFSI	   Guidance	   Document	   also	   stipulates	   substantive	  
norms,	   such	   as	   those	   developed	   by	   the	   Codex,	   which	   the	   standards	   of	   the	   benchmarked	  
schemes	  have	  to	  meet,	  depending	  on	  the	  scope	  for	  which	  the	  scheme	  is	  benchmarked.	  EASA	  
also	  employs	  standards	  that	  prescribe	  the	  way	  in	  which	  SROs	  should	  adopt	  codes	  of	  practice	  
and	   the	   normative	   documents	   upon	   which	   these	   standards	   should	   be	   based.	   The	   Best	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Practice	  Recommendation	  of	   EASA	  on	   code	  drafting	   and	  public	   consultation	   clearly	  define	  
how	   SRO	   should	   draft	   and	   revise	   their	   normative	   documents.	   More	   generally,	   EASA	  
promotes	   the	   use	   of	   the	   Consolidated	   ICC	   Code	   of	   Advertising	   and	   Marketing	  
Communication	   Practice	   as	   the	   common	   substantive	   baseline	   for	   codes	   of	   advertising	  
practice	  in	  Europe	  and	  around	  the	  world.	  
	   A	   third	   layer	   of	   meta-­‐regulation	   concerns	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   activities	  
employed	  by	  private	   food	  safety	  certification	  schemes	  and	  SROs.	  A	  major	  part	  of	   the	  GFSI	  
Guidance	  Document	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   schemes	  have	  designed	   their	  
certification	  processes.	  Following	  the	  norms	  produced	  by	  ISO,	  GFSI	  requires	  amongst	  others	  
that	   the	   certification	   procedures	  meet	   specific	   criteria	   for	   the	   frequency	   and	   duration	   of	  
audits,	   and	  are	  performed	  by	  accredited	   third	  party	   certification	  bodies.	   This	  emphasis	  on	  
the	   design	   of	   certification	   procedures	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   importance	   that	   GFSI	  
attributes	   to	   raising	   the	   level	   of	   integrity	   and	   credibility	   of	   private	   certification	   schemes.	  
Since	  these	  schemes	  operated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  paid	  audits	  performed	  by	  commercial	  bodies,	  
their	   integrity	  and	  independence	   is	  always	  at	  risk.	  A	  careful	  governance	  design	  such	  as	  the	  
separation	   of	   advice	   and	   auditing	   services	   in	   certification	   bodies	   contributes	   to	   their	  
credibility.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   EASA	   meta-­‐standards	   are	   adopted	   for	   both	   monitoring	   and	  
enforcement	   activities	   by	   SROs.	   Unlike	   the	   case	   of	   GFSI,	   however,	   EASA	   draws	   specific	  
attention	   to	   the	   complaint	   handling	   and	   enforcement	   of	   codes	   of	   conduct.	   This	   can	   be	  
explained	  by	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  enforcement	  activities	  of	   SROs.	  These	  are	   complaint-­‐based	  
and	   very	   little	   proactive	  monitoring	   is	   done.	  Accordingly,	   EASA	  has	   adopted	  one	   guidance	  
document	  on	  compliance	  monitoring,	  though	  at	  least	  six	  explicitly	  on	  enforcement.97	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  three	  levels	  of	  meta-­‐regulation,	  EASA	  involves	  a	  separate	  form	  of	  
meta-­‐regulation.	   Since	   1992,	   EASA	   has	   facilitated	   the	   resolution	   of	   complaints	   on	  
transnational	  advertising	  practices	  via	  a	  cross-­‐border	  complaint	  handling	  mechanism.	  Here,	  
the	  primary	  role	  of	  EASA	  is	  to	  coordinate	  between	  its	  SRO	  members	  and	  transfer	  complaints	  
lodged	  before	  an	  SRO	  in	  one	  country	  to	  the	  SRO	  in	  the	  country	  where	  the	  editorial	  decision	  
to	  publicise	   the	  advertising	  was	  made.	  Accordingly,	   EASA	   fulfils	   an	   important	   coordinating	  
function	   in	   resolving	   transnational	   disputes	   about	   advertising.	   This	   role	   can	  be	   considered	  
meta-­‐regulatory	  as	  EASA	  determines	  which	  of	  its	  SRO	  member	  should	  resolve	  a	  cross-­‐border	  
dispute.	  Accordingly,	   it	   guides	   and	   facilitates	   transnational	   enforcement	   activities,	  without	  
itself	   resolving	   the	  underlying	  disputes.	  GFSI,	  by	   its	  very	  nature,	  does	  not	  operate	  a	  cross-­‐
border	  coordination	  mechanism.	   It	  encourages	   food	   retailers	  and	  manufacturers	   to	  accept	  
all	   certificates	  of	  GFSI-­‐recognized	   schemes.	   This	   acceptance	   is	   entirely	   voluntary.	   The	  GFSI	  
does,	  however,	  coordinate	  different	  and	  conflicting	  interests	  of	  its	  membership	  and	  seeks	  to	  
harmonise	  existing	  private	  food	  safety	  standards.	  
The	  forms	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  should	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  
similar	   because	   they	   both	   leave	   ample	   space	   for	   regulatory	   regimes	   to	   “go	   beyond”	   their	  
meta-­‐standards.	  Furthermore,	  both	  bodies	  do	  not	  specifically	  prescribe	  how	  these	  regimes	  
should	   implement	   the	   standards.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   guidance	   of	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   can	   be	  
qualified	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  minimum	  harmonization	  that	  is	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  
harmonizing	   the	   laws	   of	  Member	   States	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   European	  Directives.	   By	  
following	   this	   approach	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   enable	   the	   construction	   of	   an	   international	   level-­‐
playing	  field	  for	  private	  food	  safety	  certification	  schemes	  and	  SROs	  respectively.	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Compliance	  with	  meta-­‐regulation	  
How	  is	  compliance	  with	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	  of	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  assessed	  and	  enforced?	  
In	   short,	   the	   GFSI	   has	   a	   formalized	   assessment	   procedure	   laid	   down	   in	   the	   Guidance	  
Document.	  Assessment	  with	  meta-­‐standards	  by	   EASA	   is	  more	   fluid:	   the	   timing,	   scope	   and	  
result	  of	  assessment	  are	   less	  clear	  and	  are	  addressed	  to	  the	  SROs	   in	  an	   informal	  way.	  The	  
final	  decision	  in	  GFSI	  is	  binary	  (either	  recognition	  or	  not),	  while	  EASA’s	  assessment	  does	  not	  
end	   in	   a	   final	   decision,	   but	   rather	   in	   performance	   scores	   (green	   or	   red)	   on	   the	   different	  
elements	  included	  in	  the	  meta-­‐standards.	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   GFSI,	   the	   assessment	   of	   compliance	   with	   the	   Guidance	   Document	  
essentially	  coincides	  with	  the	  benchmarking	  exercise.	  Compliance	  with	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  
Guidance	  Document	   leads	  to	  recognition	  of	  the	  scheme	  by	  the	  GFSI.	  After	  recognition,	  the	  
GFSI	  does	  not	  actively	  enforce	  compliance	  with	  these	  standards.	  The	  benchmarking	  process	  
is	  carried	  out	  again	  after	  the	  Guidance	  Document	  has	  been	  revised.	  Such	  a	  re-­‐benchmarking	  
process	  is	  required	  every	  four	  years.98	  If	  the	  scheme	  owner	  then	  no	  longer	  complies	  with	  the	  
Guidance	   Document	   it	   simply	   loses	   its	   status	   of	   GFSI-­‐recognized	   scheme.	   In	   the	   period	  
between	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   private	   food	   safety	   scheme	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	  
version	  of	  the	  Guidance	  Document,	  the	  GFSI	  shall	  annually	  audit	  recognized	  schemes	  based	  
on	  self-­‐assessment	  that	  comprises	  an	  internal	  audit.99	  
	   In	   the	  case	  of	  EASA	  compliance	  with	   the	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	   is	  not	  assessed	  
through	  a	  formal	  benchmarking	  process.	  Instead,	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  level	  of	  compliance	  
of	   the	   SROs	   with	   the	   standards	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Best	   Practice	   Self-­‐Regulation	   Model,	   the	  
Advertising	  Self-­‐Regulation	  Charter	  and	  the	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendations	  is	  based	  on	  self-­‐
reporting	  and	  monitoring	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors.	  Compliance	  with	  the	  Best	  Practice	  Self-­‐
Regulation	  Model	  and	  Best	  Practice	  Recommendation	   is	  not	  enforced	   formally,	   since	  both	  
are	   intended	  as	   guidelines	   for	  best	   practice	   for	   the	   individual	   SRO	  members.	   Both	   remain	  
non-­‐binding	  and	  their	   implementation	   is	  subject	  to	  the	  context	  of	  national	  public	   laws	  and	  
regulations,	  as	  well	  as	  negotiations	  with	  national	  industry	  representatives.100	  The	  Advertising	  
Self-­‐regulation	  Charter,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  considered	  binding	  for	  EASA	  members	  as	  
they	   are	   required	   to	   sign	   the	   Charter	   as	   an	   obligation	   under	   EASA’s	   rules	   of	   association.	  
Enforcement	  of	  the	  Charter	  has	  been	  pursued	  informally,	  mainly	  through	  peer	  pressure	  from	  
fellow	   SRO	   members	   at	   EASA’s	   annual	   meetings	   and	   consultations	   with	   the	   Board	   of	  
Directors	  or	  EASA’s	  Secretariat.	  
	  
Functions	  of	  meta-­‐regulation	  
The	  meta-­‐regulatory	  standards	  adopted	  by	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  fulfill	  in	  part	  the	  same	  functions.	  
In	   general	   it	   can	   be	   held	   that	   both	   meta-­‐regulators	   seek	   to	   contribute	   to	   enhance	   the	  
regulatory	  capacity	  of	  private	  food	  safety	  certification	  schemes	  and	  SROs.	  It	  might	  even	  be	  
held	   that	  GFSI	   and	   EASA	  have	  been	  quite	   successful	   in	   achieving	   that	   goal.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
GFSI,	   the	   consecutive	   versions	   of	   the	   Guidance	   Documents	   have	   each	   raised	   the	   bar	   for	  
private	   certification	   schemes	   requiring	   ever-­‐stricter	   conditions	   for	   audit	   independence,	  
quality	  and	   scope.	  As	   for	  EASA,	   its	  guidance	  documents	  have	  been	   influential	   in	   triggering	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   for	   food	   Safety	   Schemes,	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   and	   GFSI,	   enhancing	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   party	  
certification,	  March	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99	  Requirements	  for	  food	  Safety	  Schemes,	  2.6.5	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   See:	   EASA,	   ‘Digital	   Marketing	   Communications	   Best	   Practice’	   (Brussels	   2008),	   http://www.easa-­‐
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institutional	   changes	   in	   code	  development	   and	   independent	   complaint-­‐handling	   that	   have	  
strengthened	   advertising	   self-­‐regulation	   in	   Europe.	   These	   achievements,	   ultimately,	   also	  
contribute	  to	  enhancing	  the	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  transnational	  private	  regulatory	  
regimes	   in	   the	   field	   of	   food	   safety	   and	   advertising.	   In	   fact,	   compliance	  with	   the	  GFSI	   and	  
EASA	   procedural	   meta-­‐standards	   is	   now	   considered	   the	   industry	   standard	   that	   scheme	  
owners	  and	  SROs	  should	  adhere	  to.	  When	  they	  do,	  they	  are	  generally	  keen	  to	  stress	  that	  a	  
sign	  of	  excellence,	  increasing	  their	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  regulatory	  arena.	  	  
	   Another	  major	   function	   of	  meta-­‐regulation	   as	   pursued	   by	  GFSI	   and	   EASA	   is	   that	   is	  
plays	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   coordinating	   and	   harmonizing	   different	   private	   standards	   and	  
regimes.	  Both	  the	  GFSI	  benchmarking	  process	  and	  EASA	  best	  practice	  guidance	  steer	  private	  
standards	  and	  regimes	  toward	  convergence	  on	  a	  single	  (but	  minimum)	  standard	  for	  private	  
regulation.	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   both	   constitute	   a	   forum	   for	   discussion	   on	   how	   to	   achieve	   that	  
convergence,	   for	   example,	   by	   disseminating	   best	   practices	   and	   new	   developments.	   The	  
background	   of	   the	   convergence	   differs,	   however.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   GFSI,	   private	   certification	  
schemes	  that	  apply	  for	  GFSI-­‐recognition	  compete	  for	  suppliers	  that	  obtain	  certification	  and	  
for	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   to	   accept	   certification	   against	   their	   standard.	   This	  
competition	   and	   the	   diverging	   standards	   were	   costly	   and	   inefficient	   for	   both	   buyers	   and	  
suppliers	  because	  of	  the	  	  high	  costs	  of	  multiple	  auditing	  and	  certification.	  Efficiency	  concerns	  
were	   therefore	   a	   principle	   driver	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   GFSI.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   EASA,	  
competition	   between	   SROs	   is	   absent	   because	   the	   regulatory	   activities	   and	   influence	   is	  
defined	  by	  the	  national	  territory	  of	  the	  SROs.	  While	  different	  national	  models	  of	  advertising	  
self-­‐regulation	  raise	  costs	  for	  advertisers	  that	  engage	  in	  transnational	  advertising	  activities,	  
the	  convergence	  set	  in	  place	  by	  EASA	  is	  less	  cost-­‐driven	  than	  by	  GFSI.	  The	  major	  drivers	  for	  
EASA’s	   activities	   were	   instead	   the	   pressures	   of	   the	   European	   Commission	   to	   better	  
coordinate	   self-­‐regulation	   at	   the	   European	   level	   and	   the	   advent	   of	   new	   EU	   legislation	   on	  
advertising.	  	  	  
	   This	  background	  in	  part	  explains	  why	  the	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  GFSI	  has	  also	  developed	  
a	  function	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  EASA.	  GFSI’s	  benchmarking	  exercise	  
plays	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   achieving	  market	   access.	   Recognition	   by	   the	  GFSI	   enhances	   the	  
credibility	  and	  therefore	  also	  the	  marketability	  of	  the	  scheme	  among	  suppliers	  and	  buyers.	  
The	  suppliers	  possessing	  a	  certificate	  of	  a	  GFSI-­‐recognized	  scheme	  can	  also	  benefit	  from	  that	  
recognition	   as	   this	   implies	   that	   a	   host	   of	   international	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   will	  
accept	   their	   products.	   In	  many	  markets	   it	   is	   fast	   impossible	   to	   trade	  without	   certification	  
against	   a	   GFSI	   recognized	   food	   safety	   scheme.	   For	   retailers,	   a	   higher	   uptake	   of	   GFSI-­‐
recognized	  scheme	  by	  suppliers	  may	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  easier	  resourcing	  of	  products	  worldwide	  
without	   carrying	   out	   audits	   or	   the	   need	   to	   work	   with	   preferred	   suppliers.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
EASA,	   by	   contrast,	   market	   access	   is	   not	   a	   function	   of	   meta-­‐regulation.	   Instead,	   EASA’s	  
activities	  focus	  on	  coordination	  of	  different	  nationally-­‐based	  self-­‐regulatory	  systems.	  	  EASA’s	  
cross-­‐border	  complaint	  handling	  system	  is	  the	  principal	  manifestation	  of	  this	  function.	  
	  
Role	  of	  public	  actors	  
Finally,	  attention	  must	  be	  drawn	  to	  the	  role	  that	  public	  institutions	  play	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  meta-­‐regulation.	  Whereas	  this	  role	  is	  strong	  in	  the	  case	  of	  EASA,	  meta-­‐regulation	  of	  GFSI	  
has	  developed	  autonomously	  without	  much	  collaboration	  with	  public	  actors.	  GFSI	  bases	  its	  
meta-­‐standards	  in	  part	  on	  norms	  adopted	  by	  the	  Codex,	  an	  expert	  body	  established	  by	  the	  
Food	   and	   Agricultural	   Organization	   (FAO)	   and	   World	   Health	   Organization	   (WHO)	   of	   the	  
United	  Nations.	   The	   participation	   of	   representatives	   of	   public	   organizations	   in	   the	   GFSI	   is	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limited	   to	   a	   few	  members	   in	   the	  Advisory	   council	   and	   a	   FAO	   representative	   in	   the	  Global	  
Regulatory	  Affairs	  Working	  Group.	  The	  latter	  group	  has	  to	  develop	  a	  work	  plan	  to	  ‘actively	  
engage	   governments	   in	   recognizing	   and	   accepting	   GFSI	   benchmarked	   schemes	   as	   an	  
effective	   and	   efficient	   tool	   for	   global	   food	   safety	   management’	   and	   ‘actively	   engage	   and	  
build	   relationships	   with	   CODEX	   Alimentarius	   and	   WTO	   (…)	   to	   further	   align	   industry	   and	  
government	  efforts	  in	  food	  safety.’101	  It	  is	  only	  now	  GFSI	  has	  matured,	  that	  it	  currently	  seeks	  
formal	   recognition	   by	   national	   and	   international	   governments	   and	   aims	   at	   integrating	   its	  
meta-­‐standards	  with	  Codex	  and	  WTO	  (SPS)	  requirements.	  GFSI	  is	  a	  pivotal	  actor	  at	  the	  global	  
level	  of	  food	  safety	  discussion	  that	  public	  actors	  can	  no	  longer	  disregard.	  The	  rise	  of	  GFSI	  has	  
significantly	  strengthened	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  industry	  to	  lobby	  in	  this	  field	  and	  it	  would	  not	  
surprise	  us	  if	  GFSI	  would	  be	  successful	  in	  doing	  so.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  EASA,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  role	  of	  public	  actors,	  in	  particular	  the	  European	  
Commission,	   is	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   impact	   and	   function	   of	   EASA’s	   meta-­‐regulatory	  
standards.	   As	   noted	   above,	   the	   concluding	   report	   of	   the	   2005	   Roundtable	   on	   Advertising	  
Self-­‐Regulation	   constituted	   a	   firm	   confirmation	   by	   the	   Commission	   of	   EASA’s	   approach	   to	  
enhance	  the	  operation	  of	  advertising	  self-­‐regulation	  in	  Europe.	  It	  effectively	  puts	  EASA	  in	  the	  
driver’s	   seat	   to	   push	   further	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   different	   national	   approaches	   to	   self-­‐
regulation	  in	  the	  European	  advertising	  industry.	  	  This	  can	  also	  be	  witnessed	  more	  recently	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  Online	  Behavioral	  Advertising.	  At	  the	  Roundtables	  organized	  by	  
the	  Commission	  to	  discuss	  the	  industry’s	  proposal	  for	  self-­‐regulation	  the	  Commission	  made	  
sure	  that	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  industry	  would	  follow	  the	  principles	  set	  by	  EASA.	  While	  
the	   Commission	   thus	   left	   ample	   space	   for	   the	   online	   advertising	   industry	   to	   regulate	   the	  
matter	  of	  Online	  Behavioral	  Advertising	  itself,	  it	  seeks	  to	  control	  this	  process	  by	  making	  sure	  
EASA’s	  approach	  is	  followed.	  The	  informal	  delegation	  of	  regulation	  of	  online	  advertising	  this	  
implies,	  offers	  an	  important	  recognition	  of	  EASA’s	  regulatory	  activities	  and	  genuinely	  offers	  a	  
degree	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  it.	  
	  
5.	  Conclusion	  
This	   paper	   discussed	   the	   emergence	   of	   private	   meta-­‐regulation	   in	   transnational	   private	  
regulation.	   Several	   factors	   drive	   the	   rise	   of	  meta-­‐regulators	   in	   this	   field.	   By	   analyzing	   the	  
meta-­‐regulatory	   activities	   of	   GFSI	   in	   the	   field	   of	   food	   safety	   and	   EASA	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
advertising	  we	  argued	   that	  meta-­‐regulation	   in	   the	  private	  domain	   is	   principally	   concerned	  
with	   the	   bolstering	   of	   the	   capacity,	   credibility	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   transnational	   private	  
regulatory	  regimes	  and	  the	  convergence	  between	  such	  regimes.	  While	  both	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  
do	  adopt	  meta-­‐standards	  to	  enhance	  rule	  compliance	  and	  enforcement	  activities	  of	  private	  
regulatory	   regimes,	   their	   principal	   goal	   is	   to	   establish	   common	   standards	   that	   boost	   the	  
operation	  and	  performance	  of	  these	  regimes.	  In	  this	  sense,	  private	  meta-­‐regulation	  offers	  a	  
level-­‐playing	   field	   for	   private	   regulation	   and	   aids	   the	   harmonization	   of	   private	   regulatory	  
activities	   in	   specific	   issue	   areas.	   Private	  meta-­‐regulation	  may	   thus	  be	   said	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
building	   of	   a	   transnational	   community	   of	   private	   regulatory	   regimes	   that	   fosters	   common	  
goals,	   offers	   a	   forum	   for	  discussion	  and	   reduces	   rivalry	  between	  different	   regimes.102	   This	  
also	   offers	   opportunities	   for	   public	   actors	   such	   as	   states	   and	   intergovernmental	  
organizations	  to	  engage	  with	  and	  tap	   into	  the	  capacity	  of	  private	  meta-­‐regulators	  as	  these	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   http://www.mygfsi.com/structure-­‐and-­‐governance/gfsi-­‐technical-­‐committee/global-­‐regulatory-­‐affairs.html	  
(last	  accessed	  May	  2014).	  
102	  Compare	  Loconto	  and	  Fouilleux	  2013,	  who	  observe	  the	  same	  dynamics	  in	  relation	  to	  ISEAL.	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institutions	   constitute	   a	   nexus	   of	   industry	   interests	   and	   other	   stakeholders	   involved	   in	  
private	  regulation	  often	  at	  multiple	  layers	  of	  governance.	  
We	  also	  note	   that	   drawbacks	  of	   the	  development	  of	   transnational	  meta-­‐regulators	  
such	  as	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  exist.	  Both	  GFSI	  and	  EASA	  have	  reinforced	  the	  concentrated	  powers	  
of	   large	  corporate	   retailers	  and	  manufacturers	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   food	   supply-­‐chain	  and	  of	  
advertising	  industry	  respectively.	  A	  powerful	  transnational	  private	  meta-­‐regulator	  may	  also	  
easily	  relegate	  national	  governmental	  agencies	  to	  second-­‐class	  regulators	  in	  the	  food	  safety	  
domain.	   Only	   a	   concerted	   strategy	   of	   different	   international	   and	   national	   governmental	  
players	   seems	  able	   to	  counterbalance	   the	  power	  of	   the	  private	  meta-­‐regulator.	  What	  also	  
appears	  key	  is	  that	  approaches	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  meta-­‐standards	  are	  driven	  out	  of	  the	  
market	   or	   are	   otherwise	   forced	   to	   leave	   the	   scene.	   While	   the	   GFSI	   and	   EASA	   have	  
successfully	  increased	  convergence	  and	  standardization,	  they	  have	  concomitantly	  excluding	  
other	  practices.	  Efsis	  and	  HACCP	  dropped	  out	  of	  GFSI	  and	   the	  British	  model	  of	  advertising	  
self-­‐regulation	   stood	  model	   for	   the	   EASA,	   thus	   rejecting	   the	   German	   and	   French	  models.	  
Finally,	  of	  course,	  all	  parties	  that	  are	  not	  capable	  or	  willing	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  set	  standard	  are	  
excluded	  from	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  is	  particularly	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  GFSI,	  which	  
has	   been	   criticized	   for	   in	   effect	   excluding	   small	   farmers,	   artisan	   food	   producers	   and	  
developing	  countries.	  
	  
	  
